

Confidential.

MEMORANDUM

ON

OUR RELATIONS WITH TIBET,

BOTH PAST AND PRESENT

TOGETHER WITH A FORECAST OF THE FUTURE DEVELOP-
MENTS OF OUR POLICY IN THAT REGION.

BY

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CONTENTS.

	PARAGRAPH.
Description of the Country	1
Natural Resources	7
Character of the People	25
Material Condition of the People	32
System of Religious and Political Control	36
Attitude towards Foreigners	43
Relations of Tibet with China	52
Our previous Relations with Tibet	69
Relations of Tibet with Russia	103
Our Attitude towards Russia and China in regard to Tibet	123
The Present Situation	130
The Present Objects of the Government of India	140
Trade Prospects in Tibet	142
Trade Routes to Tibet	149
Choice of new Trade Mart in Tibet	151
Means for securing the Objects of Government	152
Possible Coercive Measures	163
International Aspect of the Question	173
Our Future Permanent Policy	174
General Conclusions	182

INTRODUCTION.

"His Majesty's Government are compelled to recognise that circumstances have recently occurred which throw upon them the obligation of placing our relations with the Government of Lhasa upon a more satisfactory footing," wrote the Secretary of State to the Viceroy on February 27th, 1903; and His Lordship further said that His Majesty's Government were entirely in agreement with His Excellency in thinking that, having regard to the geographical position of Tibet on the frontier of India, and its relations with Nepal, "it is indispensable that British influence should be recognised at Lhasa in such a manner as to render it impossible for any other power to exercise a pressure on the Tibetan Government inconsistent with the interests of British India."

The circumstances to which the Secretary of State referred were the reported conclusion of agreements of some kind between Russia and China, and between Russia and Tibet placing Tibet under the protection of Russia, while at the same time the Tibetans had declined to receive letters addressed to the Dalai Lama by the Viceroy.

The Russian Ambassador, however, officially assured Lord Lansdowne that there was no Convention with Tibet, either with Tibet itself or with China, or with any one else, nor had the Russian Government any agents in that country or any intention of sending agents or missions there. Accepting these assurances the Secretary of State telegraphed on May 28th that His Majesty's Government wished to confine the negotiations which it had been decided to enter into with the Chinese and Tibetans, to frontier and grazing questions and trade relations, and did not wish that the location of a Political Agent at Lhasa or Gyantse, should form any part of our proposals. They wished, however, to ensure that the Tibetans should not be able to avoid or repudiate obligations entered into on their behalf in any fresh Treaty or Convention.

What sort of a country this little-known Tibet is, in which, as Lord Lansdowne observed to the Russian Ambassador, it is inevitable that we should exercise a certain amount of local predominance; what are its resources; what the character of the people, their attitude towards foreigners in general and the Russians and ourselves in particular, and their relations with their nominal suzerain, the Chinese; I hope to show in this Memorandum. I wish to trace, too, the history of our own relations with this people, as well as the story of their recent dealings with the Russians, and from all this accumulated information deduce the best method of carrying out the instructions of the Government of India; of securing the establishment of a properly regulated trade mart in Tibet; and of placing our trade relations with the Tibetans upon a sound and satisfactory footing.

In drawing up this Memorandum I have had the great advantage of personal conversation on the subject with Mr. White, who has held the post of Political Officer in Sikkim for fourteen years; and with Captain O'Connor, who for several years has made Tibet his special study and has just prepared a valuable report upon it.

DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNTRY.

1. Most of those who will do me the honour to read this memorandum will have a pre-conceived idea that Tibet is a cold, bleak, barren plateau, situated away in the far interior of Asia, at the back of the Himalayas, and utterly unsuited for the habitation of any sane man or animal. In this idea they will only be partially right. It is true that by far the greater part of Tibet—all that part which, fortunately for us, faces towards the Russian Possessions—answers to this description. Captain Wellby travelled over that great, dreary plateau, known as the Chang-Thang, whose lowest part is higher than Mont Blanc, for four months "without seeing any vegetation higher than an onion;" while for more than 14 weeks he never saw any sign of mankind; and even then only a travelling caravan. Captain Bower, who travelled across the plateau in another direction, described it as "all the same, rounded, undulating hills, with wide, open valleys, and here and there sharply defined snowy ranges." The majority of the places that would afford grazing to the Tibetans' flocks and herds in summer are, he says, too far distant from suitable winter quarters to be made use by the nomads. They are consequently left to innumerable herds of wild animals; and the Tibetans merely graze their herds round the edge of this stupendous, barren plateau.

2. Such is quite two-thirds of Tibet. But the remaining third—and fortunately for us the third nearest India—is very different. This portion is further south, and consequently warmer, and it has the additional advantage of coming under the partial influence of the monsoon. So here at Khamba Jong, at the height of Mont Blanc, barley is now ripening and the vast plains before our camp are sufficiently covered with grass to afford grazing to thousands of sheep and goats and yaks. And this is the worst part of what might be called habitable Tibet. On the road to Shigatse from here—four marches—the valleys are "thickly dotted with hamlets," and Mr. White, who has ridden some distance in that direction, says that in these broad, well-watered valleys thousands of acres more might easily be cultivated if there were more population for the work. Running up from Shigatse to Gyantse is a valley which Turner describes as "extremely rich, with abundant crops of ripe corn, and exceedingly populous." This valley, Sarat Chandra Das says, is from 60 to 70 miles long, and has an average breadth of 10 miles, and every inch of it, he says, is cultivated. Barley, wheat, millet and pulses being grown here while groves of poplars and willows, and even orchards are seen.

3. Passing on from Gyantse towards Lhasa, Manning, the only Englishman who has ever been there, thus describes the Brahmaputra Valley which is crossed on the way. "The valley was wide, a lively stream ran through it, houses and villages were scattered about . . . The place was not destitute of trees, nor of arable land, and an air of gaiety was spread over the whole, and I thought on the faces of the people." Sarat Chandra Das speaks, too, of the "forest-clad mountains" which rose above the Brahmaputra. On the way to Lhasa he speaks of "numbers of small villages," "terraced fields, planted with barley" and of poplars and willow trees. While near Lhasa he saw "gardens and groves of trees" surrounding the houses; the plain round Lhasa was "extraordinarily fertile," and "everywhere cultivated" with barley, wheat and buckwheat; and the road was "alive with travellers, mostly grain-dealers, on their way to the city with trains of yaks, ponies, mules and donkeys."

4. Further east still the country presents an even greater contrast to the barren Chang-Thang, and Bower speaks of South-Eastern Tibet as a country of deeply-cut, well-cultivated valleys, with steep, wooded hillsides. "The country bears," he says, "a great resemblance to many parts of Kashmir, and in beauty is at least its equal."

5. But the most promising part of Tibet is evidently that along the valley of the Brahmaputra below where the longitude of Lhasa crosses it. This, as Captain O'Connor writes in his Report, may be called the "garden of Tibet." The side valleys are rich and well cultivated; and all native explorers who have visited this part unite in praising its climate and scenery. The river flows in an open valley, with well-wooded sides; and is thickly populated and well-cultivated on either bank. The explorer K—p, who went farthest down this great river, speaks of every kind of cultivation along it, till at last, as he nears British territory in Assam, he finds cotton fields, and even mangoes and plantains. A contrast

indeed to Wellby's "vegetation no higher than an onion" at the other end of Tibet facing towards Russia!

6. What the area of this remarkably varied country is it is impossible to say precisely, for its boundaries are so ill-defined in the direction of China that no one can state exactly which districts are Tibetan and which Chinese. The *Statesman's Year Book* gives the area as 463,200 square miles: and it may be said to be roughly as only slightly smaller than the Provinces of Bengal, Bombay, the North-West and the Punjab put together.

NATURAL RESOURCES.

7. Really the most valuable produce of Tibet is her wool. But the product which will undoubtedly attract most attention to her, and which may have a powerful effect upon her near future, is gold. It is the gold which has much to say in attracting the Russians. Russians have often said this to me and it is reported that there is a Russian mine-prospecting expedition in Tibet at the present moment. And certainly I never heard in Rhodesia of the same signs of gold as travellers tell of in Tibet, yet the gold of Rhodesia was enough to attract thousands of settlers and the investment of millions of pounds. The gold of Tibet then is a factor of considerable importance in a consideration of our trade relations with the country.

8. Turner, in 1800, writes of the Tibetans: "Their mines and minerals are capable of opening to them such inexhaustible sources of wealth as to be alone sufficient to purchase everything of which they stand in need." Horace del Penna had already reported that there were gold mines in the provinces of U, Tsang Chang, Takpo, Komboko and Kham. Huc says, "Tibet is rich beyond all imagination in metals. Gold and silver are collected there so readily, that the common shepherds have become acquainted with the art of purifying these metals." Sir Richard Strachey saw some old gold pits in the neighbourhood of the Manasarowar Lake in 1848, and reported that the gold was found in grains and nuggets of various sizes; and that considering what a Tibetan Government is, and what Tibetan workmen are, the small amount produced "was no proof that the alluvium of Tibet may not be rich in gold." A Pundit in 1867 visited the Thok Jalung goldfield in Western Tibet (Long. 82°; Lat. 32°), and reported the "yield of gold large, and the find occasionally very heavy." He saw one nugget of about 2 lbs. weight. He was there in the summer, which is not the most favorable season for the workers, and there were then only 300 tents; but in the winter time he said there are 6,000 tents of workers there. The Pundit also saw a large number of disused goldfields round Thok Jalung, and from what he heard during two expeditions he stated that there was "a whole string of goldfields extending all the way from Lhasa to Rudok." The price of gold was Rs. 30 per ounce: and it may be noted that an ounce of pure gold is intrinsically worth £ 4 4s. 11½d. Saunders, the surgeon attached to Turner's Mission in 1783, writes: "The country properly explored promises better than any I have seen.....to reward the labours of a mineralist. Accident, more than a spirit of enterprise and enquiry, has already discovered the presence of many valuable ores and minerals. The first on this list is deservedly gold: they find it in large quantities, and frequently very pure. In the form of gold-dust it is found in the beds of rivers, and at the several bendings, generally attached to small pieces of stone, with every appearance of its having been part of a larger mass. They find it sometimes in large masses, lumps and irregular veins." Rockhill, the American traveller, mentions "the famous Gork goldfields" in North-Eastern Tibet. "Discovered in 1888," he says, "they yielded to the Chinese who flocked to them over 10,000 ounces of gold in less than two years, but now they are abandoned, the primitive methods of the gold-workers being only remunerative with the richest gravels." Littledale passed "a good many abandoned gold diggings" on the road from Lhasa to Rudok the same as those referred to by the Pundit mentioned above. Bower speaks of "innumerable gold workings" near Li-tang in South-Eastern Tibet, and says the exchange between silver and gold was then 14 to 1 [on the same date in England 24 ounces of silver would have to be given for 1 ounce of pure gold]. Many others of the States of South-Eastern Tibet bordering on China are famous for their output of gold, and the Abbé Desgodins enumerates a number of gold mines in those

parts, notably on the banks of the Lower Yang-tse and Mekong and not far distant from the eastern end of Assam.

9. There is ample evidence then of the existence of gold in considerable quantity in almost every part of Tibet. As the late Mr. Colman Macaulay says: "The mineral wealth of Tibet has formed the basis alike of Indian fable and of Chinese proverbs. Indian fancy placed the home of the gods far away among the snows, on mountains glittering with gems and gold. The Chinese have a saying that Tibet is both the highest and the richest country in the world." "The gold dug from the Tibetan mines," writes a Batang Missionary, "is shining in the rays of the sun, on gilt pinnacles of the pagodas, on the idols, on the beams and columns of the temples, on the chairs, couches and ornaments of people of high rank."

10. And what has been extracted so far under the discouragement of religious superstition, of Government prohibition to private individuals; by means of rude implements and unskilled labour; and without any systematic scientific research or investigation; is probably but a faint indication only of the output which would follow if religious scruples were waived; Government restrictions withdrawn; the whole country explored by mining experts, and the mines discovered worked with modern machinery and skilled labour. Under such conditions the output would be much more likely to be reckoned in millions than in thousands of pounds per annum.

11. Silver also is found. Saunders, the surgeon who accompanied Turner, says: "Two days from Tissoolumboo [Shigatse] there is a lead mine..... most lead contains a portion of silver, and some in such proportion as to make it an object to work the lead ore for the sake of the silver." Horace del Penna mentions silver in the Province of Kham, South-Eastern Tibet. And Captain O'Connor, in his report on Tibet, records three silver mines on the left bank of the Yang-tse River, south of Batang; eleven mines on the Lower Mekong, and nine mines in Mupin, north-east of Ta-tsién-lu [Darchendo].

12. Iron, according to Captain O'Connor, is found on the Mekong River, in about Lat. 30°; between the Mekong and the Salwin, two or three marches south-west of Chiamdo; on the left bank of the Salwin below Batang; and along the left bank of the Lower Mekong.

13. Turner says that "copper mines furnish materials for the manufactory of idols, and all the ornaments disposed about the monasteries, on which gilding is disposed." And Saunders, his surgeon, says that he saw ores and loose stones containing copper, and had not a doubt of its being found in great abundance throughout the country. But Sarat Chandra Das says that there are no copper mines in Tibet and that the copper is imported from Nepal and Calcutta. It seems, however, to be abundant near Batang, and Captain O'Connor records that mines are found on the banks of the Yang-tse-kiang south of Batang; and on both banks of the Lower Mekong, both localities at some distance from Lhasa, and in the extreme south-eastern corner of the country.

14. Lead is found, as mentioned above, two marches north of Shigatse; and in one or two places on the Lower Mekong.

15. Mercury is found in seven localities on the banks of the Lower Mekong.

16. There is a sulphur mine at a place called Napo on the Lower Mekong.

17. Salt is found in great quantities on the east plateau called the Chang Thang, where it is obtained by evaporation of the water of the innumerable salt lakes of that region. Sarat Chandra Das also reports the existence of an "immense salt mine in the Chang district north-west of Lhasa, and one month's journey north of Shigatse, which furnishes inexhaustible quantities of rock-salt to all Tibet and the neighbouring countries." And Captain O'Connor records that there are salt mines also in Eastern Tibet along both banks of the Lower Mekong near the 29th degree of latitude. Of these there are according to the Abbé Desgodins some forty or fifty.

18. The finest borax is produced in Western Tibet.

19. Coal does not appear to have been yet discovered in Tibet, though Captain O'Connor has heard from natives rumours of its being found near both Lhasa and Shigatse. And of precious stones the only mention is of agate which is

said to be found in the extreme south-eastern corner of Tibet near the Mishmi country and of turquoises.

20. This finishes the list of mineral products of Tibet, as far as we know them at present. Of animal products the most important is wool. This is the great and inexhaustible staple of Tibet, and it can be produced on its vast plains and mountain slopes in any quantity and of the finest quality. From Tibet comes the wool with which the finest Kashmir shawls are made, and, as Mr. Hennessy remarks, hundreds and even thousands of maunds of shawl wool are necessarily produced every year and *wasted* on the great prairie of the Chang Thang. From here at Khamba Jong vast plain-like valleys can be seen capable of supporting thousands more sheep than are grazed upon them; and so it is all through the highlands of Tibet.

21. Musk is another important animal product of Tibet. It is worth from ten to twelve times its weight in silver on the Chinese frontier. Musk deer are plentiful in the ravines and forests of the whole of Eastern Tibet.

22. Thousands of yaks are reared in Tibet: they furnish meat and milk to the inhabitants and are useful as pack animals.

23. Ponies are not reared in such numbers as might be expected, but in the district of Kongbo there are said to be numbers of excellent ones.

24. The vegetable products of Tibet, as might be expected, are small. Enough wheat, barley, peas, etc., are grown for the needs of the people. One special product is wild rhubarb, which grows in great abundance on the hillsides of Eastern Tibet, and is greatly prized in China for medicinal purposes. The supply is practically unlimited and exceeds the demand. As has been mentioned above, the hillsides of South-Eastern Tibet and of the valley of the Brabnaputra are well clothed with forest, but timber at present seems to have no commercial value. Whether it might not be floated down the great rivers which flow out of Tibet is a problem of the future.

CHARACTER OF THE PEOPLE.

25. Such is the country and such are its resources. A country of enormous extent and vast mineral potentialities; and its south-eastern corner, bordering on Assam, rich not only in mineral, but in the fertility of its soil and salubrity of its climate. What the character of the people is who have so far kept Europeans so rigidly at arm's length from access to it, it is now our business to examine. And just as we had to rid ourselves of preconceived ideas regarding the inhospitality of the country and come to recognise that quite a large portion of it was rich in minerals and fertile in soil, so we shall have to appreciate the fact that the Tibetans, inhospitable and forbidding as they appear at first, and as they undoubtedly are to a certain point, yet have quite a third of their character genial and inviting. Any one who has been here in Tibet and seen the mighty range of the Himalayas stretching as an apparently impregnable barrier between this country and the outer world can see how the Tibetans must *naturally* have become an exclusive people. They are obstinately and doggedly exclusive and shy of intercourse with their fellow-men. The difficulties of obtaining access to them, even for natives of India, is too well known to need repetition; and the two delegates from Lhasa who are here at the present time have strict orders to hold no personal intercourse with us, and they thoroughly follow out their orders. These people are too excessively suspicious. "Any evidence of extraordinary curiosity even in the common affairs of life was" says Turner "sufficient, in an instant, to raise a host of suspicions." And they are not only suspicious of strangers, but of each other. "The Lhasa people," said the Minister of Shigatse to Sarat Chandra Das, "are suspicious and insincere." Similarly, the father of the Tashi Lama told Turner that the Lhasa Chiefs "were crafty, designing men, of fair exterior, but deep and black at heart." Faithlessness, too, is put down by some travellers as a trait in their character. "The character of all these nomads is much the same—greedy, faithless, suspicious," writes Bower. And Littledale mentions a gross case of faithlessness on the part of a high Lhasa official, who, as part of a solemn agreement, gave him a letter ordering all Tibetans to help and not delay him on his journey to the Ladak frontier, but who also, at the same time, wrote a

letter to an official on the way to turn Littledale back wherever he was. This piece of bad faith was made all the worse because, when Littledale had asked that every word of the letter which was given to him should be explained, the Lama had kept saying "I am an old man, and shall soon die: do you think I wish to cheat you?" The Tibetans are also grossly superstitious. "They are governed in all concerns of life" writes Turner, "by an awful regard to the dictates of superstition, ... Devoted to astrology, they yield a willing homage to its professors." Huc, too, says that the Tibetans have a superstition that "the Dalai Lama will one day be proclaimed universal sovereign and under his holy influence Lamaism will soon be restored to its pristine vigour. superb Lamaserics will arise everywhere, and the whole world will recognise the infinite power of Buddhist prayer." "These predictions," he adds, "are related by every one in most minute detail but what is most surprising is that no one seems to entertain the least doubt of their fulfilment." The belief of the people in the magical power of the Lamas is notorious, and was never better exemplified than when they charged up to the British rifles in Sikkim under the firm conviction that they had been rendered invulnerable by the magic power of the Lamas.

26. This shy exclusiveness, this suspiciousness, this faithlessness, and this belief in superstitions are, however, traits which are very common in Asiatic peoples, and especially among hill races. And what is equally noticeable in the Tibetan is his geniality and politeness when once he does meet a stranger; and the kindness and the general brightness of his nature. "Generosity and frankness enter largely into their character," says Huc; and Turner writes that "humanity and an unartificial gentleness of disposition are the constant inheritance of a Tibetan.... Without being servilely officious they are always obliging: the higher ranks are unassuming; the inferior respectful: nor are they deficient in attention to the female sex. Comparatively with their southern neighbours, the women of Tibet enjoy an elevated position in society." Bogle, Turner and Huc, the only three Europeans who have really lived among the Tibetans to become properly acquainted with them, have all given most favourable accounts of their disposition. They certainly have many of the attributes of gentlemen, and are eminently a people to whom Europeans would "take."

27. They are, too, an eminently religious people. Even Sarot Chandra Das was struck with their devotion, and after visiting one of their great monasteries said that it was only by visiting such places that it was possible to realise "with what assiduity and devotion the Buddhists perform the sacred duties of their religion, the deep interest they take in the collecting of sacred books and images, and their zealous care in preserving them." The intense reverence paid by the people to the two great Lamas; the fact that they have allowed the Dalai Lama to hold supreme temporal as well as spiritual power; the large proportion of the people who become monks and nuns; and when monks, the time they spend in religious exercises,—are all evidences of the large part which religion takes in their character. Bogle says that the time he spent at Tashi Lumpo was "monastic to the greatest degree. Nothing but priests. Nothing from morning to night but the chanting of prayers, and the sound of cymbals and tabors." Turner, too, describes how every day at sunrise, noon and sunset the greater number of the 2,500 monks of the monastery in which he was staying used to meet for service; and how, "on every third day, the morning was devoted to proclaiming aloud the attributes and praises of the Supreme Being; a service which was performed with a vehemence of vociferation perfectly astonishing." Besides these public services the Lamas engaged daily in private prayer accompanied by music, "together with the solemn pageantry of procession." "All these taken together," continues Turner, "soon convinced me that I was living in the midst of men who made religion the sole business of their life." An important feature of their religious practice which he noticed was that they do not worship separately as do the Hindus, "but unite together in prodigious numbers to perform their religious services, which they chant in alternate recitation and chorus."

28. Huc, who lived for several weeks with the Regent of the Dalai Lama, gives an equally emphatic impression of the part which religion plays in

the life of this people. "The Tibetans," he says, "are eminently religious; butvery little disposed to mysticism. Instead of confining their devotions within their inner hearts, they like, on the contrary, display by outward acts; and accordingly pilgrimages, noisy ceremonies in the Lamaseries, prostrations on the top of their houses, are practices extremely to their taste. There exists at Lhasa a very touching custom.....In the evening, just as the day is verging on its decline, all the Tibetans stay business, and meet together, men, women, and children, according to their sex and age, in the principal parts of the town, and in the public squares. As soon as the groups are formed, every one kneels down, and they begin slowly and in under-tones to chant prayers. The religious concerts produced by these numerous assemblages create throughout the town an immense solemn harmony, which operates forcibly on the soul."

29. I have dwelt at length upon the religion of the people because it is the main and governing feature in their national character. With the Chinese religion counts for nothing. With the Tibetans, on the other hand, it counts for everything. Religiousness is their governing characteristic: and in considering our future relations with them, this is the point upon which our greatest attention must be fixed.

30. Of the intellectual capacity of the people some travellers speak in very favourable terms. They certainly have not the same capacity as the Chinese nor as the Hindus, yet they are by no means a dull, rough, uncultured race. And the fact that they were able to impress their religion on the conquering Mongols; that they have for centuries been able so to keep up their religious authority over the Mongols as to make successive Chinese Emperors feel the necessity of keeping on good terms with the Dalai Lama; and that they have been able to keep themselves together in a compact nation, acting in unflinching obedience to the Dalai Lama, is sufficient to show that they have no mean intellectual capacity. They possess, too, a vast literature, and for many generations have practised the art of printing, though unfortunately, according to Turner, their art has been limited in its use by the powerful influence of superstition and has been appropriated principally to sacred works. The recorded conversations of European travellers with Tibetans show that the latter have a full measure of intelligence. Huc found the Regent at Lhasa an extremely able and intelligent man, and anxious to be informed about foreign affairs and European culture. Sarat Chandra Das gives many instances of the capacity of the Minister at Shigatse, who showed him a work he was writing on history, rhetoric, astrology and photography; and who studied English with the Babu, and interested himself in such books as "Ganot's Physics." Bower speaks of some Lamas who came to visit him as "a strikingly able and intellectual-looking set of men." And the intellectual capacity of the Tibetans would probably be a good deal more evident than it is if it were not stifled by the iron rule of the monks and their gross superstitions. The Minister of Shigatse above referred to was killed in the most barbarous manner for evincing too intelligent an interest in secular matters.

31. These are the chief characteristics of the Tibetans; but it will perhaps serve to fix them in mind if I repeat the accounts which those travellers who have lived among them give of the leading men whom they met. Bogle, after stating how much better bred and more affable the Tibetans are than their southern neighbours, and with what greater attention they treat their women, thus describes the Tashi Lama of Shigatse: "The expression of his countenance," he says, "is smiling and good-humoured.....His disposition open, candid and generous. He is extremely merry and entertaining in conversation. I endeavoured to find out, in his character, those defects which are inseparable from humanity, but he is so universally beloved that I had no success, and not a man could find it in his heart to speak ill of him." Of the General of Shigatse, Bogle records that he was "a very cheerful, pleasant man" and fond of chess. Speaking of the Regent of the Tashi Lama of his time, Turner says that "there was a sweetness of expression in his countenance which was highly prepossessing. His language was plain and unaffected.....and delivered with that mild, unassuming manner which strongly characterises Tibetans of good education." "In the discussion of geographical topics," adds Turner, "his mind took a very extensive range and scarcely left any quarter of the globe untouched." To a high

official who was placed in attendance on him Turner became deeply attached, and he writes: "I felt on his departure the loss of an agreeable companion and an useful instructor, and we really parted, I believe, with mutual reluctance."

MATERIAL CONDITION OF THE PEOPLE.

32. In considering trade relations with Tibet some knowledge is required of the style in which the people live and of their material condition generally. The common people of course live in rough houses and dress simply. But their houses are perhaps better than the houses of most Himalayan hill people, and their dress is of coarse home-made cloth and in the winter of sheep-skins. Their household furniture consists of nothing more than an occasional small low table; and their cooking utensils are only of pottery. The agricultural implements used are wooden ploughs with iron tips, sickles, iron-tipped hoes, axes, and knives for shearing sheep. The upper classes dress in broadcloth and silks, and the highest classes of all live in a style of some magnificence, an idea of which may be formed from a description Turner gives of a procession he witnessed near Shigatse. The Regent "rode attended by two or three hundred horsemen, and he himself was surrounded by a select party principally consisting of officers of State. He was dressed in a yellow satin robe, lined with sable fur. A garnet-coloured shawl mantle.....was passed round the body.....The horse he rode was decorated with large crimson tassels and other splendid trappings. The select attendants were equipped nearly after the same manner.....the more humble ranks were clad for the most part in cloth. ...There was none in the cavalcade, as far as I could perceive, who bore any kind of arms"—a significant testimony to the peaceful character of the people.

33. The buildings of Tibet, the monasteries and forts, are more remarkable for their solidity and strength than for their beauty. And the size of the Tibetan monasteries is sometimes immense, several containing from 3,000 to 10,000 monks. The larger monasteries are, in fact, as Waddell remarks, "like small towns, with long streets of cells, two or three stories high and usually surrounding small courtyards." Manning speaks of the magnificent effect produced by the "lofty towering palace" at Lhasa, which forms, he says, "a majestic mountain of a building"; and Huc says "it merits in every respect the celebrity which it enjoys throughout the world." "The palace," he continues, "is an aggregation of several temples of various size and decoration; that which occupies the centre being four stories high and overlooking all the rest: it terminates in a dome entirely covered with plates of gold, and surrounded by a peristyle, the columns of which are in like manner all covered with gold."

34. The amount of gold, indeed, which they use, as well as the great size of these monasteries, is good indication of the wealth of the country. Turner had the good fortune to be able to visit the tomb of the Tashi Lama at Shigatse, who had died in Peking, and his account of it shows the immense wealth stored up there. At the entrance he found some "gigantic figures" "very richly gilt." Beyond this were "two ponderous doors.....embossed with huge gilded knobs" Inside the building was "a most beautiful pyramid," at the base of which the body of the Lama was deposited "in a coffin of pure gold," presented by the Emperor of China. The late Lama was represented in an effigy of gold which crowned the pyramid. Round the borders of a canopy which enclosed the figure were suspended all the various rosaries used by the Lama, and consisting of the richest gems—pearls, emeralds, rubies, sapphires, coral, amber, etc. The sides of the pyramid were encased in plates of solid silver, and on each step of the pyramid were arranged all sorts of rarities which had been presented as offerings to the Lama, among which were costly snuff-boxes and valuable trinkets, choice specimens of china, masses of lapis lazuli, vases of silver, etc. On the right side of the pyramid was a life-size statue of the Lama, made of solid silver gilt. Suspended from the ceiling were the most beautiful and costly silks and satins. And close by the pyramid were two pieces of black velvet embroidered all over with pearls.

35. A country which can raise a mausoleum of this description must be wealthy. But unfortunately, as Huc says, "the gold and silver collected by the people is absorbed by the great men, and especially by the Lamaseries, those immense reservoirs, into which flow, by a thousand channels, all the wealth of these vast regions... Money being thus accumulated in the coffers of the privileged classes, and on the other hand the necessaries of life being only procurable at a very high price..... a great proportion of the population is constantly plunged in the most frightful destitution."

SYSTEM OF RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL CONTROL.

36. These people are organised into what we cannot but acknowledge is a solid nation. "Among them," says Turner, "all is system and order. The mind readily obeys the superiority it has been accustomed to acknowledge. A sovereign Lama, immaculate, immortal, omnipresent, omniscient, is placed at the summit of the fabric. He is esteemed the vicegerent of the only God, the mediator between mortals and the Supreme. They view him only in the most amiable light, as perpetually absorbed in religious duty..... He is also the centre of all civil government, which derives from his authority all its influence and power. At the same time that he is the soul which animates the whole system, a regular gradation, from the most venerated Lama, through the whole order of Gyilongs, to the youngest novitiate is observed with rigid severity." The present Dalai Lama is some twenty-nine years of age. He is said to be of firm and energetic character, and appears to have really asserted himself in his position.

37. Yet in certain matters and especially in external affairs there is an authority supreme over him. This is a kind of National Assembly or Council, the importance of which does not appear to have been previously known, but of which we have just heard through the investigation of Captain O'Connor. When important matters such as the admission of foreigners to Tibet or the conclusion of a commercial treaty, come up for consideration, they cannot be disposed of even by the Dalai Lama; they have to be brought before an assembly chiefly composed of monks from the great monasteries in and around Lhasa, but to which lay officials are also admitted. Thus the Deputy Commissioner of Darjiling in his frontier reports mentioned that when Dorjief's proposals to the Tibetans to place themselves under Russian protection came up for consideration, the Dalai Lama, on the advice of his Executive Council, referred the matter to this Assembly. The preponderating influence in this Assembly is heavily monastic and in it Shigatse is very imperfectly represented. The supreme affairs of Tibet, and among them the control of our coming negotiations, are then in the hands of the monks, and of all the monks of Tibet in the hands of the Lhasa monks who are the most bigoted, ignorant and seclusive.

38. The monks of Tibet in whose hands then really lies the sovereign power form a considerable proportion of the population and they live in enormous monasteries chiefly round Lhasa. The number in these monasteries in some cases amounts to seven or eight thousand; and smaller ones are scattered all over the country even in the wildest parts. The Tibetans are, in fact, as Turner remarks, divided into two distinct and separate classes, those who carry on the business of the world, and those who hold intercourse with heaven. No interference of the laity ever interrupted the regulated duty of the clergy: the latter, by mutual contract, take charge of all their spiritual concerns; and the former by their labours enrich and populate the State.

39. Immediately under the Dalai Lama is a sort of Executive Council consisting usually of four members called Ka-lön or Shapas who are laymen, and sometimes of a fifth member who would be an ecclesiastic. These members are elected for life, and sit daily in the Council House at Lhasa for the transaction of political, judicial and administrative business. At present there are four lay members and one ecclesiastical member of this Council. Working under these members of Council are three or four secretaries, all ecclesiastics, who wield

great influence and one of whom is at present at Khamba Jong representing the Tibetan Government. The district officers by whom the country is directly administered are divided into two classes—lay and ecclesiastical—and it is a rule that a monk and a layman should be associated together in every post.

40. The revenue, which Sarat Chandra Das states is estimated at 20 lakhs of rupees, the bulk of which goes into the monasteries, is derived principally from a land-tax and a family-tax; and is collected by the district official called the Jong-pen. The maximum State demand on agricultural produce is two-fifths of the crop.

41. The military forces of the State number 6,000, and are under the orders of six Generals. In time of war every lay male is liable to be called upon for military service: and the monks also join in.

42. The total population of the State has been estimated at from four to six millions.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS FOREIGNERS.

43. There is no need to emphasise the fact that the Tibetans are obstinately, and to all appearances ineradicably, hostile to foreign intercourse. The Chinese Resident at Lhasa, even in an official letter to the Viceroy, writes: "Up to the present time the Tibetans have refused to hold friendly intercourse with foreigners, and have even refused all communications from that source." "The local officials came and entreated me to stop, informing me that they would all be executed if they allowed us to pass," writes Littledale; and every other European traveller in Tibet has had much the same experience.

44. Sarat Chandra Das says that the jealousy of the Tibetans is supposed to date from 1791-92, when English soldiers were believed to have taken part in the war which followed the incursion of the Gurkhas into Tibet. This belief may have intensified the feeling, but it did not originate it, for Bogle in 1774 and Turner in 1783 found it prevailing even then. Bogle, though well received by the Tashi Lama of Shigatse, was refused permission by the Regent of Lhasa to go there. The Tashi Lama showed Bogle a letter from the Regent in which the latter said: "The Feringhees are fond of war; and, after insinuating themselves into a country, raise disturbances and make themselves master of it." Even the friendly Tashi Lama admitted to Bogle that he had at first been afraid to admit him to Tibet as he had heard so much of the power of the Feringhees; that the Company was like a great king, fond of war and conquest; and as his business and that of his people was to pray to God, he was afraid to admit any Feringhees to his country. And at his parting interview with the Tashi Lama the latter said: "The Regent and the Ambans are excessively jealous of foreigners coming into the country. I wish the Governor would not at present send an Englishman. You know what difficulties I had about your coming into the country, how I had to struggle with the jealousy of the Regent and people at Lhasa. Even now they are uneasy at my having kept you so long. I would wish therefore that the Governor would rather send a Hindu." Seeing this to be the attitude of the Tibetans, Bogle reported that the admission of Europeans was "a thing simply impossible."

45. Turner, nine years afterwards, was civilly and warmly received by the Regent of the Tashi Lama who had succeeded the Tashi Lama of Bogle's time: but he says that the Regent, in receiving him into the country, acted rather according to his private sentiments than in accordance with the wishes of the Government at Lhasa. He said that "a strong jealousy of all intercourse with the inhabitants of Hindustan prevails universally amongst the natives on its northern borders." Good evidence of this is contained in a letter which the Gurkha Raja wrote to the Lhasa Regent about this time advising him "to have no connection with the Feringhees, and not to admit them into his country, but to follow the ancient custom, which he was resolved likewise to do."

46. The Regent at Lhasa did not, however, require incitement of this kind. "He was," says Turner, "remarkable for the turbulence and activity of his disposition, and his violent enmity to all intercourse with the English." His successor had the same prejudices, and studying the disposition of the people sought

to establish himself in office by a conformity to their opinion. Turner was therefore unable to visit Lhasa.

47. Manning did, indeed, succeed in getting there, chiefly because he could speak Chinese, and being a doctor was able to do services for the Chinese. The French priests Huc and Gabet also were successful in reaching Lhasa. But all three of these travellers were soon removed, and Huc writes: "The Tibetans, why, we know not, have taken it into their heads that the English are an encroaching people who are not to be trusted." He adds, however, "that it is probable the English would not be excluded more than any other people, had not their invasive march through Hindustan inspired the Dalai Lama with a natural terror."

48. Fear then is probably at the root of their motives of hostility to foreigners, and their fear of the admission of natives of India almost as much as of Europeans was probably due formerly to their dread of a Mohamedan invasion, and now to their connecting natives of India with ourselves. And what the Tibetans fear if their country ever did come under foreign control is, says Sarat Chandra Das, the extinction of Buddhism. A dread of this, he says, is "the feeling which prevails in the dominant class, the clergy." The monks, who are the real rulers of the country, know that with the influx of foreigners, and especially of Europeans, their influence would inevitably decline; so they naturally exert all that influence to keep foreigners and especially Europeans at a distance.

49. And in this policy they were in the past encouraged by their suzerains the Chinese. When Turner expressed a wish to take part in certain important ceremonies, the Regent of Shigatse, though otherwise very friendly, politely refused permission on the ground that "the Chinese, whose jealousy of strangers is too well known, might take offence." And this unfriendly attitude of the Chinese was greatly strengthened after the Nepal war of 1792, when the Chinese believed that we assisted the Gurkhas against them. Consequently when the Chinese army established itself in Tibet, they "prohibited the approach of strangers, even of natives of Bengal and Hindustan." And it was under orders from Peking that both Manning and Huc and Gabet were expelled from Lhasa. Manning wrote that the Manchu Mandarins detested Europeans, and he tells how one Mandarin said to him: "These Europeans are very formidable; now one man has come to spy the country, he will inform others. Numbers will come, and at last they will be for taking the country from us."

50. The Chinese have, however, of late somewhat modified their former attitude. In 1886 they gave a passport to Mr. Macaulay to conduct a mission to Lhasa. They have frequently given passports to Russian scientific expeditions to travel in Tibet. They employ an Englishman in their service at Yatung: and as far as they can, consistently with their vanishing prestige in Tibet, they have done their best to observe the trade convention they made with us. They certainly do not encourage intercourse between outside countries and Tibet. On the other hand, I have not seen signs of their actively thwarting it as they used to in former days.

51. And unyieldingly hostile to all foreign intercourse as in the attitude of those who guide the destinies of Tibet, it must not be supposed that this represents the opinion of the mass of the people. "It is palpable that the common people bear strangers no ill-will," writes Littledale "and that all the trouble springs from Lhasa." This is also the opinion of Mr. White who has lived on this frontier for so many years. And it is certainly our experience since we have been at Khamba Jong. The ordinary people have none of that fanatical hatred of us as Kafirs which the Pathan tribes have. On the contrary whenever we have a chance of meeting them they show themselves genial and even jovial. They are held so tightly under control by the Lamas that they dare not disobey them. But they are by nature tolerant, good-natured and easy-going; so whenever they are at liberty to show their true disposition, their attitude towards us is entirely friendly, and traders especially would welcome facilities of intercourse. This is not worth very much, but it is worth recording as some little counterpoise to the inveterate hostility of the dominant Lamas.

RELATIONS OF TIBET WITH CHINA.

52. From Captain O'Connor's summary of the history of Tibet it seems that as far back as the seventh century the Chinese penetrated to Lhasa after having been attacked by the Tibetans and from that time to this they have exercised a fluctuating influence, sometimes all-powerful, sometimes hardly perceptible, in the affairs of Tibet. In 1206 Tibet was conquered by the great Jenghiz Khan, and about the middle of the 13th century the Chinese Emperor Kubilai Khan, a descendant of Jenghiz Khan, embraced Lamaism as his faith and actively promoted the Lamaistic doctrines in China and Mongolia. He may also be said to have founded the hierarchical system in Tibet by creating the Lama of the Sar-kya monastery a pope. While, then, the Mongols and Chinese appear to have mastered the Tibetans by force of arms, the latter effected a spiritual conquest over their masters, and to the present day the state of things thus inaugurated continues. The physical mastery remains in the hands of the Chinese. The spiritual influence, especially over the Mongols, rests with the Tibetans. This is an important political point which we shall have to keep constantly in mind and it will be referred to again later on.

53. In the fifteenth century an incarnation of the great reformer Tsong-Kapa (who founded the yellow cap school and whose successor was installed as the first Grand Lama at Tashi Lumpo near Shigatse) was given the title of Dalai Lama by a Mongolian ruler; and in 1640 a Mongol prince invaded Tibet and having dethroned all the petty princes of the country made the Dalai Lama supreme. This Dalai Lama established himself at Lhasa, built there the huge palace of Potala, and was the first of the Priest-Kings who have combined in their own persons temporal as well as religious authority. In the year 1650 he visited China and was confirmed by the Emperor (a Manchu) in his title of Dalai Lama, a clear evidence of the interdependence of the Tibetans and the Chinese and Mongolians upon one another: the Tibetans depending upon the Chinese and Mongols for temporal support: the latter depending upon the Tibetans in spiritual matters.

54. Towards the close of the 17th century internal troubles induced the Chinese Emperor Khang-hi to send an army to Lhasa. Chinese troops subdued all Central and Eastern Tibet and in 1703 withdrew again. In 1717 an army of Zungarians made a marvellous march from Khotan to Lhasa, but the Chinese Emperor Khang-hi drove them out of Tibet again, and restored the Dalai Lama, at the same time securing Chinese influence at Lhasa by the establishment there of two Ambans as his representatives, supported by an adequate force.

55. In 1749 the Chinese Ambans at Lhasa put the Regent to death and in the tumult which followed the Chinese were massacred by the populace, whereupon an army was sent from China which restored order and put the Regents from that time for some years onward completely under the influence of the Ambans.

56. The Gurkhas in 1792 invaded Tibet and sacked the great monastery of Tashi Lumpo near Shigatse. The Tibetans appealed to the Chinese for help. An army was sent from China; the Gurkhas were defeated; and were made to disgorge their plunder.

57. Yet another invasion of Tibet occurred in 1841 when the Dogras established themselves in Western Tibet. Once again the Tibetans applied to the Chinese for assistance; and once again they were delivered from their enemies by a Chinese army, which advanced even as far as Leh, though they were unable to establish themselves there, and succeeded only in re-establishing the former boundary.

58. In the Gurkha war of 1854 the Tibetans seem to have held their own fairly well without the aid of the Chinese; and favored by the internal dissensions of the Gurkhas, to maintain their frontier and to conclude a peace on the condition that they paid Rs. 10,000 annually to Nepal and permitted the Nepalese to establish an agency and trading station at Lhasa. But when they

without any provocation invaded Sikkim in 1886 and attacked British troops, it was only due to Chinese diplomatic intervention on their behalf that severe punishment by the British Government, and probably the occupation of the Chumbi valley, was averted.

59 From this short account of the relations which have existed between Tibet and China for the last twelve centuries it is evident that the Tibetans, or, at any rate, the monks, owe much to the Chinese. They have been saved by the Chinese from internal dissensions: they have been protected from invasion from abroad. Why have the Chinese been so magnanimous when all they appear to get in return is a yearly tribute mission and a shadowy suzerainty over the country? The best answer to this question is, I think, the following observation by the Abbé Huc who was well-acquainted with China and Mongolia as well as Tibet. He says: "The Tatar-Manchu dynasty saw from the commencement of their elevation the great importance of conciliating the friendship of the Dalai Lama, whose influence is all-powerful over the Mongol tribes; consequently they have never failed to retain at the court of Lhasa two grand mandarins..... The ostensible mission of these individuals is to present, under certain fixed circumstances, the homage of the Chinese Emperor to the Dalai Lama, and to lend him the aid of China in any difficulties he may have with his neighbours. Such, to all appearance, is the purport of this permanent embassy; but, in reality, they are only in attendance to flatter the religious belief of the Mongols and to bind them to the reigning dynasty by making them believe that the Government of Peking has great veneration for the divinity of the Budha-ta. Another advantage of the embassy is, that the two Kin-Tchais (Ambans) can easily, at Lhasa, watch the movements of the people on the confines of the Empire."

60. This appears to me a very reasonable explanation of the attitude of the Chinese to the Tibetans: for there is ample evidence to show that the Dalai Lama at Lhasa and the Tashi Lama at Shigatse and the ecclesiastical authorities in general of Tibet have an enormous influence over the Mongols, who were at one time a people greatly to be feared. Colonel Browne, the Military Attaché at Peking, says that to this day they are intensely attached to Lamaism. And Huc says they are essentially a religious people: with them the future life is everything, the things of this world nothing. They regard themselves as foreigners travelling through life; and this feeling, deep and universal, develops itself in the practical form of incessant journeys and pilgrimages; and the places of all others to which they most desire to direct their way are Lhasa and Shigatse. Here only among the Lamas of the West is to be found the true doctrine. "The nearer you approach the West," say the Mongols, "the purer and more luminous will the doctrine manifest itself." And any Mongol Lama who has visited Lhasa is received on his return as a man to whom the mysteries of the past and of the future have been revealed. When we consider this, and consider too the fact that according to Huc there is no Lamasery of any importance in Mongolia the Grand Lama or superior of which is not a man from Tibet, we can have some idea of the influence which the monk-rulers of Tibet must exercise over the Mongols.

61. This was realised most thoroughly by the great Chinese Emperor Khang-hi, who, when he found all the Khalka Mongols from the district, in the direction of Urga (the very part from which Jenghiz Khan arose and subdued China), arrayed against him to defend the dignity of the Grand Lama of Urga, he immediately opened negotiations with the Dalai Lama at Lhasa and succeeded in inducing him to use all his influence with the Lamas for the re-establishment of order. The Chinese Emperor was further able to arrange that the Grand Lama of Urga (the Taranath Lama, as he is sometimes called) after his successive deaths should always be bound to make his transmigration to Tibet. Huc, from whom the above account is taken, adds that Khang-hi had good reason to believe that a Tibetan by origin would espouse with reluctance the resentments of the Khalka Mongols against the Court of Peking. His re-incarnation is now always found, according to Waddell, in Central or Western Tibet. The present one was born in the Bazaar of Lhasa; and a Lama of the Depung Monastery accompanied him to Urga as tutor.

62. But while the Chinese Emperors have always treated the Grand Lamas of Tibet with the utmost respect—the Emperor coming out in person to meet the Tashi Lama of Shigatse on one occasion when he visited Peking,—and while the Tibetans have always looked upon the Emperor of China with the most profound awe and reverence, they do not seem to have allowed the Chinese much practical control in their internal affairs. Theoretically the Amban is supposed to have very comprehensive powers. According to an old Chinese book, “He is to consult with the Dalai Lama and the Tashi Lama on a footing of perfect equality on all local questions brought before him. All Members of Council and ecclesiastical officials must submit to his decision in all questions. He must watch over the condition of the frontier defences, inspect the different garrisons, and direct Tibet's relation with people living outside the border. He will fill the vacancies among the members of Council and Treasurers in conjunction with the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama must do nothing without his sanction in relation with foreign nations. The relations of the Gurkhas with Tibet are under the supervision of the Amban. The Council may not hold direct inter-communication with tribes outside the frontier. Letters must be forwarded to the Amban, who will act in concert with the Dalai Lama.”

63. This is the theoretical position of the Chinese in Tibet. And in practice the Chinese do really impress their superiority upon the Tibetans. Turner remarked how their “influence overawed them then in all their proceedings and produced a timidity and caution in their conduct more suited to the character of subjects than allies.” Manning, too, speaks of the imperiousness of the Chinese towards the Tibetans and says: “The Chinese lord it here like the English in India. The Tibetans stand before them.” The Chinese have, in fact, always assumed the character of the superior race, and from the little I have seen of the Chinese and Tibetans here I should say they seem still to assume it, and the Tibetans to acknowledge it *in all matters ceremonial*.

64. Yet Turner remarked on “the jealousy with which they regarded any interference of the Chinese,” and also that they were “averse to own any immediate dependence upon China.” And of late years they have certainly overcome some of their timidity and shown themselves very much inclined to defy the authority of the Chinese. When Bower showed the Tibetan officials, who tried to stop him, his Chinese passport, and asked them what was the meaning of the Amban's presence at Lhasa, if that was not to be read or come under discussion, they replied that “the Amban was allowed to live at Lhasa as a visible sign of the friendship existing between the two countries; but that Tibet was in no way under China.” And the Chinese official whom Bower met at Chiamdo in Eastern Tibet said he was most willing to do everything he could for Bower, “but the Lamas were a very turbulent set and he really had no power at all.”

65. The most cogent proofs, however, of the little influence the Chinese practically have over the Tibetans is shown in the matter of the Tibetan invasion of Sikkim, and the carrying out of the Treaty which was subsequently made. For nearly two years after the Tibetans had invaded Sikkim the Government of India waited in patient expectation of the Chinese being able to cause their withdrawal. But Chinese influence proved quite unable to effect it, and British troops had to drive the Tibetans out by force. Again, though the Chinese Amban assured the British representatives that the formal assent of the Tibetans to the Treaty was quite unnecessary, and that he would arrange at Lhasa that they should observe it, events have proved that the Chinese have had no power over the Tibetans in this matter. After Chinese and British officials together had set up boundary pillars, Tibetans have thrown them down: and Tibetan officials, to Mr. White last year and to myself this year, have absolutely repudiated the Treaty, refusing to be bound by it. The Chinese delegate here now is most anxious to commence negotiations at Khamba Jong, but the Tibetan delegates obstinately assert that they will negotiate nowhere but at Gyagong, which they consider the boundary, but which is several miles within the boundary laid down by the Treaty signed by the Amban; and he is

unable to make them conform to his wishes. And all these matters are external matters in which presumably the Chinese, as the suzerain Power, should have an especial degree of control.

66. The truth seems to be that both the Chinese and the Tibetans only make use of each other when they have need the one of the other. When the Mongols are likely to be troublesome, the Chinese Emperor applies to the Dalai Lama to use his influence to keep them quiet. When Tibet is invaded, the Dalai Lama seeks aid from the Chinese Emperor. At the present time the dread of the great Mongol hordes, who six centuries ago overran all China, most of Asia and a large part of Europe, has almost disappeared. The Southern Mongols are effete and worthless, and their country is being slowly absorbed, as I have myself seen, by Chinese immigrants; and the Northern Mongols have practically been resigned by the Chinese to the control of Russia. The Chinese Emperor has therefore very much less need than formerly of the good offices of the Dalai Lama. At the same time the Tibetans have become aware of the decaying power of China. They know that she is powerless to help them as she used to so readily in former days, so they see very little use in paying attention to her.

67. Consequently the Chinese now are afraid to exert any pressure on the Tibetans in any matter which the Tibetans are likely to resent being put on them, and the young Dalai Lama, who, as it happens, is a man of strength and independence of character, clearly shows he will accept no dictation from the Chinese. The latter, indeed, seem half afraid that if they give the Tibetans any slight excuse, they will drive them out of Tibet. The position is, then, one of great delicacy for the Chinese, who are thoroughly aware of their weakness and who are also thoroughly aware that certain high Manchu officials at Peking have been trying to barter away Tibet to the Russians in return for assistance nearer home. There is at the present time a report that the new Amban will bring more Chinese troops with him, and the Viceroy of Szechuan and others are known to be anxious to revive Chinese influence in Tibet; and if these troops are brought and the new Amban is an able man, the Chinese may partially recover their former prestige and authority. But it is also possible, according to my informant, that the Tibetans may oppose the admission of any more troops, and take this as an excuse for throwing off the Chinese yoke altogether.

68. Such are the present relations between China and Tibet. And in one respect only do the Tibetans adhere most obstinately to what they speak of as an old agreement with the Chinese. It is that already mentioned that they may not hold any direct inter-communication with tribes outside the frontier and that letters must be forwarded to the Amban. In this matter they are most faithful to their agreement. They have refused to receive a letter from the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama; and the delegates here refused even to take a translation of a speech I made before them and the Chinese delegate, and which with the latter's approval I handed to them. Finding this particular agreement with the Chinese exceedingly convenient, they adhere to it with the greatest fidelity. In this and in matters of ceremonial they respect the Chinese authority, but, as far as I have been able to ascertain, in no other particulars.

OUR PREVIOUS RELATIONS WITH TIBET.

69. Before forecasting the measures which it will be necessary to take to put our trade relations with the Tibetans on a satisfactory footing, there will be advantage in recapitulating our efforts in the past in that direction and seeking to profit from the experience we have so gained.

70. As long ago as 1774, Warren Hastings, taking advantage of a very dignified letter of mediation on behalf of Bhutan from the Tashi Lama of Shigatse, sent a mission under Bogle to enter into friendly relations with the Tibetans and open up trade between Bengal and Tibet. Bogle was remarkably successful in attaining the first object. He was exceedingly well received by the Tashi Lama at Tashi Lumpo near Shigatse, and accommodated in his own house. He had

frequent conversations on the most intimate terms with the Lama, and used to spend much of his time with the Lama's nephews, "singing, smoking and drinking *chang*, and playing upon the flute and guitar." He also often visited their mother, who was "as merry as a cricket," and their two nun sisters, "who were as merry and as good-humoured as their mother." He grew very attached to the people of Tibet, and evidently they did to him, so much so that the Tashi Lama, who shortly after, at the invitation of the Emperor, visited Peking, made a special request to the Emperor to allow Bogle to visit China.

71. But though he was so well received at Shigatse, he was absolutely refused permission to visit Lhasa; he reported against sending any British agent or even British merchants to Tibet; and he does not appear to have made any definite agreement with the Tibetans regarding the admission of trade, though he obtained a promise of the hearty co-operation and support of the Tashi Lama, and induced the Bhutan Durbar to permit trade to pass through their country.

72. This, however, was a good foundation on which to start; and Warren Hastings followed up his first step by sending a second mission under Turner in 1783, to congratulate the Regency on the re-incarnation of the Tashi Lama who had received Bogle so well, and who had afterwards died in Peking. Turner was also well received and also gained the affections of the Tibetans, the Regent expressing to him his unchanged and steady friendship. He was refused permission to proceed to Lhasa, and reported how averse the Lhasa authorities were to the admission of Europeans. But he succeeded in gaining a very important concession from the Regent to the Tashi Lama, *viz.*, a promise "to grant free admission into Tibet to all such merchants, natives of India, as shall come recommended by the Governor-General; to yield them every assistance requisite for the transport of their goods from the frontiers of Bhutan; and to assign them a place of residence for vending their commodities, either within the monastery, or, should it be considered as more eligible, in the town itself." The town referred to was Shigatse.

73. The Regent was as good as his word; for in 1786 Turner, who had returned to India, reported to Government that he had heard from a native source that many natives from Bengal had brought their commodities to Shigatse; that there were no complaints of impediments or loss; and that the Regent showed the heartiest disposition to encourage commercial intercourse.

74. Our commercial relations with the Tibetans continued in a flourishing condition till 1792, when the Gurkhas invaded Tibet and plundered Shigatse: the Tibetans had to seek aid from the Chinese: the Chinese drove out the Gurkhas, but, thinking we had assisted them, established a post at Phari and absolutely prohibited the approach of strangers, "even of natives of Bengal." The door to Tibet was slammed in our face and has remained closed ever since.

75. Yet closed though it is, it would be a mistake to suppose that all our efforts since 1792 have availed nothing. Warren Hastings got the door just wide enough open to push a few thin people through; but his successors were not able to prevent its being closed upon them. Our efforts since then have, however, put us in the position of being perfectly able if we choose to force the door open; and at any rate to prevent its ever being closed against our wishes once it has been opened. The Chinese obstruction has been almost entirely removed during the last century, and now counts for nothing. The railway has been brought up to within half a dozen marches of the Tibetan border. At one point the intermediate barrier of independent tribes has been broken through and roads have been made up to the very frontier of Tibet. The whole country has been explored by secret native surveyors, and even Europeans have surreptitiously pushed their way in at the back doors, and brought back information of the country which enables us to now lay our plans with exactitude. Finally, we have obtained the gracious permission of the Chinese on behalf of the Tibetans to place our goods on the doorstep of Tibet, to be exchanged there for any which the Tibetans may condescend to be allowed to be brought out from the inside.

76. All this has been effected with very little direct intention of opening the door to Tibet—a presage we may hope of what may be done when that object is held definitely in view and persistently and continuously striven after. The breaking down of Chinese obstruction was due to a century's action in China not on the border of Tibet. The construction of the railway to Darjiling was carried out without regard to the possibility of opening up trade with Tibet. Even the forcing of our way through the barrier of independent States at Sikkim was apparently done in the ordinary course of events without any direct intention of making a road to the Tibet border. But once the aggression of the Gurkhas on the one hand and the misconduct of the Sikkim Chief on the other had forced upon us intervention in Sikkim, we turned our position there to good account. We founded a health-giving hill station in a part we annexed from Sikkim. We built a railway to it. And we constructed roads in the direction of Tibet.

77. Then after a lapse of nearly a century we threw out our first tentative feelers to try once more to gain admission for our trade to Tibet. In 1873 the Deputy Commissioner of Darjiling, Mr. (afterwards Sir John) Edgar was deputed to “enquire into the condition and prospects of trade with Tibet and the advisability of making a road through Sikkim to the Tibetan frontier.” He met the Chief of Sikkim as well as some Tibetan officials from the Chumbi valley and found that they were just as seclusive as ever, and very jealous of our attempt to use the Sikkim Government and country in our efforts to open up trade with Tibet. He was also told that the Chinese Amban had warned the Sikkim Chief that he was bound to prevent Europeans from crossing the frontier, and that if he continued to make roads for the English through Sikkim, “it would not be well with him.” A few years later Sir Richard Temple made a road through Sikkim to the Tibetan frontier at the Jelap-La: and in 1885 was commenced a really serious effort to open up intercourse with Tibet.

78. In that year Mr. Colman Macaulay was deputed to visit Sikkim and the Tibetan frontier in order to enquire into certain rumours of the stoppage of trade through Darjiling by Tibetan officials; to ascertain whether a direct road could be opened through the Lachen valley between Darjiling and the province of Tsang, celebrated for the quality of its wool; and, if possible, to communicate, through the Tibetan official at the head of the valley, a friendly message from the Government of India to the Minister at Tashi Lumpo. Mr. Macaulay succeeded in making friends with the local Tibetan officials whom he met and in collecting information regarding trade. In the following year under instructions from Government he visited Peking and obtained from the Chinese Government a passport for a mission to visit Tibet. In a Convention contracted at Chefoo in 1876 provision had been made for the protection of any mission which might be sent to Tibet; and under this a letter was written to the Chinese Resident in Tibet by the Tsungli Yamen, ordering him to afford proper protection to the proposed mission; and to impress upon those in authority that the mission is sent to establish relations of amity, and to promote commercial intercourse between India and Tibet, and to be the bearers of messages of friendship and respect to the Dalai Lama and the Penchen Irtinni (Tashi Lama).” Mr. Macaulay found the members of the Tsungli Yamen very averse to giving this passport. They stated that the Resident in Tibet had informed them that when it was known in Tibet that a passport had been given by the Chinese to Mr. Carey, he had received a petition signed “by all the clergy and laity of all the provinces” begging him to order his withdrawal. The members of the Tsungli Yamen also told Mr. Macaulay that the Tibetans were especially determined not to admit missionaries. They made, however, no suggestion of any distinction between European and Indian British subjects in regard to admission to Tibet of traders from India.

79. Early in 1886 the mission was organised by Mr. Macaulay, and was ready to start when, in deference to Chinese and Tibetan susceptibilities, and in order to facilitate the conclusion of the negotiations regarding the Burmese frontier, it was countermanded. It was stipulated, however, in the Burma Convention which was subsequently signed that “with regard to the desire of the British Government to consider arrangements for frontier trade between India and Tibet, it will be the duty of the Chinese Government, after careful enquiry

into the circumstances, to adopt measures to exhort and encourage the people with a view to the promotion and development of trade."

80. This forbearance on the part of the Government of India seems to have been entirely misunderstood by the monastic party in Tibet who concluded that we broke up the mission because we were afraid of them. They assumed a highly aggressive attitude, and sent some militia in the autumn of 1886 to occupy Lengtu, a place twelve miles inside the Sikkim frontier, where they built a stone fort blocking the road. We expected that the Chinese would be able to cause their withdrawal, but in this we were disappointed; though we gave them up to March 15th, 1888, to use their influence with the Tibetans, they were unable to procure their removal from Lengtu. So on March 20th, a British force of 1,400 men and two guns advanced upon the Tibetans, and on the following day drove them from Lengtu, the enemy offering no resistance, and retiring to Chumbi. On May 21st, 5,000 of them attacked our camp at Gnatong but were repulsed. On September 23rd they again advanced from Chumbi, and in a single night they built a wall three miles long and from three to four feet high in a position just above Gnatong. General Graham attacked this position on the following morning, captured it without any difficulty and drove the enemy in confusion across the Jelap-La. On the following day the British advanced to Rinchingong and the day after to Chumbi, returning to Gnatong on the 27th. The losses of the Tibetans were estimated at 200 killed, 400 wounded and 200 prisoners. The British loss was one officer killed and three men wounded. The enemy were estimated to number 11,000. They were drawn from all parts of Tibet—from the neighbourhood of Ladak, Lahoul, as well as from the hardy races of South-Eastern Tibet.

81. It would be supposed from the crushing defeat they received that the Tibetans would now acknowledge our superiority in arms. Such, however, is not the case. Those who actually fought against us realise it well enough, but they are only a small proportion of the population of Tibet and an unimportant portion. The abbots of the great monasteries of Lhasa were not present, and they are the men of importance in Tibetan politics. A Lama who visited Littledale said he had been on the frontier during the Sikkim war and was quite aware of the power of the Indian Government, but that the other Lamas had lived all their lives at Lhasa and thought themselves all-powerful and had no notion how weak Tibet really was. And this we have found from enquiry here at Khamba Jong to be really the case. The Lhasa officials do not acknowledge that they were beaten in their war with us. On the contrary, they say that if the Chinese Amban had not prevented them sending down 7,000 invincible monks to fight us, we would certainly have been swallowed up. This is an important point to remember. The Tibetans do not fear our military strength, and what Turner said of them seems still to be true that "placing their sole reliance in the mediation of the sacred Lama, the immaculate vicegerent of the Supreme, they imagine he covers them with the broadest shield from the encroachment of others."

82. Another important point to bear in mind is that the Tibetans in attacking the British positively disobeyed the Chinese authority. Mr. Paul, the Political Officer with the British force, was met at Rinchingong by the Chinese Commandant of Gyantse who informed him that under orders of the Amban he had proceeded post to Rinchingong which he reached on September 22nd, and "immediately told the Tibetan officials, Depons, Chipons and others, that they were not to fight the English. To this they nominally agreed, but secretly determined on fighting all the same, and did so with disastrous results."

83. At the conclusion of the war, the Chinese Resident, after a good deal of delay, came to Sikkim to negotiate a settlement and was met by Sir Mortimer Durand and Mr. Paul. In reporting the negotiations which followed Sir M. Durand says: "The Peking Government had apparently recognised the extreme forbearance which we had shown to the Tibetans and seemed to be grateful for our evident desire to treat with consideration the interests and feelings of China. Under the circumstances we had some ground for expecting that the Resident would meet us in a conciliatory spirit and that we should find him ready to accept on behalf of the Tibetans the terms which I was instructed to demand. Those terms comprised the recognition of the long established frontier between

Sikkim and Tibet, the acknowledgment of our exclusive supremacy with the Sikkim State, and an engagement on the part of the Tibetans that, for the future they would not interfere in its affairs. As a secondary object I was instructed to obtain, if possible, the concession of trade facilities, but I was not to insist on this point. Considering that the Tibetans had refused to receive a mission which the Chinese Government had agreed to let us send; that they had, further, invaded the territory of a British feudatory State; that they had been permitted to remain in occupation of that territory for nearly two years, in the hope that the Chinese Government would induce them to withdraw; considering finally that they had been completely defeated and driven across the frontier and that there was nothing whatever to prevent us from advancing into their country, it must be admitted that these terms were moderate. We did not ask for any cession of land, or for the payment of a war indemnity. We did not even revive our claim to send a mission to Lhasa. All that we required from the Tibetans was a recognition of our rights in Sikkim which were recorded in well-known Treaties, and a promise to abstain from further aggression."

84. Nevertheless, Sir M. Durand was unable to come to a settlement, the Resident asserting Chinese claim to Sikkim and denying all knowledge of our Treaties with it. It was not indeed until 1890 that a Convention was at last signed by which the Chinese acknowledged our claims in Sikkim; the frontier was defined and provision made for the subsequent discussion of Trade Regulations.

85. This Convention was made between the Viceroy and the Chinese Resident, it being assumed throughout the negotiations that the latter was acting on behalf of the Tibetans. And in view of the present repudiation of the convention by the Tibetans it will be well to quote Sir M. Durand's words to show that we had some though perhaps not sufficient reason for the assumption. He says: "The Tibetans had apparently made up their minds to accept the Resident as their representative. None of their principal men accompanied him beyond the Chumbi valley, nor did they show any willingness to enter into direct communication with us." In another report he says: "Far from being ready to negotiate and witness an agreement between us and the Tibetans, the Amban's evident desire is to take the matter entirely into his own hands and to prevent any direct dealings on our part. It is true that he engages to obtain the formal assent of the Lhasa Government to any agreement he may make, but he professes to treat this as a matter of little importance and he says that the Shafis or Tibetan councillors now in Chumbi are wholly incompetent to affix their signatures."

86. Looked at in the light of subsequent experience, it is clear that we should not have assumed that the Chinese Resident could conclude an agreement with us which would be binding on the Tibetans. Indeed we had already at the time pretty conclusive evidence that the Chinese had no control over the Tibetans, and Sir M. Durand himself reports that "Mr. Macartney and Mr. Ney Elias, who had good opportunities of judging, were at this time of opinion that the Resident was influenced by actual fear of the Tibetans." The settlement arrived at has not proved satisfactory, and most people will now, I think, be of opinion that it would have been best if Government had acted on a suggestion put forward, though somewhat tentatively by Sir M. Durand. He wrote, on January 1st, 1889: "No doubt the obvious course would be to inform the Amban and Tibetans that our hands were now free and our patience exhausted, and that immediately after the melting of the snows we should cross the frontier and compel the Government of Lhasa to listen to reason.....The occupation of Phari would in all probability be sufficient to bring the Tibetans to their senses. This is the opinion of two very competent authorities, Sir Halliday Macartney and Raja Tenduk, who is the most trusted official on this frontier. Both agree that unless we hold such a material guarantee we shall not bring the matter to a satisfactory conclusion." And both were singularly right. Sir M. Durand goes on to say that this conclusion of the affair would be most satisfactory; that we should put an end once for all to our troubles with Tibet, and to our exclusion from the country, which would then be opened to our trade. We should entirely break the influence of the Tibetans, not only in Sikkim but also in Bhutan, and we should greatly raise our reputation in all the Himalayan States.

87. It is a pity indeed that our reputation was not thus raised, for coming as a stranger here I find it at a low ebb indeed; and I doubt if there is a single man on this frontier who does not in his heart of hearts think far more of the Chinese than he does of the British: and much that we ought by this time to have been able to do by the weight of our prestige will probably now have to be done by the force of our arms.

88. In the Convention of 1890 it had been agreed that questions of trade facilities, pasturage and official communication should be reserved for future discussion. In 1893 Regulations regarding these matters were agreed to by representatives of the British and Chinese Governments. A trade mart was to be opened at Yatung at the extreme end of the Chumbi valley. All British subjects were to be allowed to go there to trade and the British Government were to be free to send officers to reside at Yatung to watch the condition of British trade there. British subjects were to be allowed to rent houses there, to sell their goods to whomsoever they pleased; to purchase native commodities, and in general to conduct their business without any vexatious restrictions. It was further agreed that goods (except Indian tea and certain prohibited articles) entering Tibet from India should be free of duty for five years, at the end of which time the Regulations might be amended and extended as experience might prove to be desirable.

89. From the very first it was evident that the Tibetans had no intention of observing the convention. Mr. White, the Political Officer in Sikkim, who visited Yatung in the summer of 1894, reported on June 9th that the Chumbi valley people combined to keep the trade in their own hands; that the Tibetans, though abiding by the letter of the convention, charged a duty of 10 per cent. on goods passing through Phari, only a march or two beyond Yatung; that no Tibetans were allowed to go beyond Phari in the direction of Yatung with their goods; that the Chinese agreed that the treaty was not being carried out in a proper spirit and no Tibetans were allowed to come beyond Phari towards Darjiling; that the Chinese confessed themselves unable to manage the Tibetans; and lastly that, "from what he could gather, the Tibetans repudiate the Treaty and assert that it was signed by the British Government and the Chinese, and therefore they had nothing to do with it." In a later report dated July 21st he says "there are persistent rumours, about which I have good reason for believing to be true, that the Tibetans at Lhasa have never given their consent to the Treaty, which they say was concluded by the Chinese and not by them, and are expressing their determination to fight India again sooner than carry out its provisions." These rumours, Mr. White said, were confirmed by the Chinese clerk of the Customs Officer at Yatung.

90. In the same year, 1894, a European trader, Mr. Korb, who under the terms of the Treaty visited Yatung to see if it were possible to open a trade there, reported that "both traders and officials were afraid of serious consequences to their trade profits if Yatung were successfully opened and that they therefore combined to put every possible obstacle in the way of establishing a new mart." Mr. Korb also reported that, even supposing the Tibetan officials were heartily to co-operate with the British Government in opening Yatung, he would still hesitate to open a branch there, as he considered the place unsuitable for the purpose, and the available space for working and building much too limited. This unsuitability of Yatung for a trade mart was indeed pointed out by the British Commissioner during the negotiations, and Phari was suggested by them, but the Chinese refused to agree to opening a mart there.

91. In 1895, when Mr. Nolan, the Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division, visited Yatung, the Tibetan representatives "very frankly informed him that they did not recognise the convention, as it was made by the Chinese only, and that they would not surrender any land in order to give effect to the Treaty."

92. In the spring of 1895 a Commission was appointed to examine and demarcate the frontier as laid down in the Treaty. This Commission was composed of delegates from India, Tibet and China. The Tibetans, however, refused to come forward, and it was only after some difficulty that the Chinese were induced

to meet the representatives of the Indian Government. Pillars were erected on the Jelap-La, Donchuk-La and Doko-La, but were immediately afterwards destroyed by the Tibetans.

93. Shortly before the expiry of the period of five years after which a revision of the Trade Regulations under General Article II might be considered, the Secretary of State asked the Government of India for a report "both on the progress made since the date of the agreement towards the settlement of the frontier, and on the extent to which the trade stipulations of the Treaty and convention have been operative." He also asked "whether the experience of the last four years had suggested to His Excellency's Government any practical measures for securing more fully the facilities for trade which the Treaty of 1890 and the convention of 1893 were intended to provide."

94. Mr. White, on being called upon, reported how the Tibetans had obstructed the demarcation of the boundary; and as regards facilities for trade at Yatung, he reported that, though it was true that British subjects were allowed to travel freely to Yatung, yet, having arrived there, they found no suitable houses or godowns and no one either to buy goods from or sell goods to. There was not a single shop in the place, and merchants were prevented by the Tibetans from visiting it. "No Tibetan proper," reported Mr. White, "(i.e., any one living outside the Chumbi valley) is allowed to bring his goods into Yatung." "Thus the whole object of the mart is nullified," he continues, "and during these 4½ years absolutely nothing in the way of business has been transacted at Yatung. If a British merchant does go to Yatung, no one is allowed to buy from him or sell to him. Yatung is no mart; it is only a registering station for goods passing between Tibet and India."

95. Mr. White further reported that Regulation IV was virtually broken, as the Tibetans still levied a 10 per cent. duty at Phari.

96. In submitting this report the Commissioner shows the particular manner in which the Tibetans had evaded the fulfilment of the convention. "The Tibetans have built a wall across the valley," he says, "a little below the site granted for the meeting of traders from the two countries, and allow no one to go through the gate for the purpose of buying or selling."

97. The Government of Bengal remarked that, though there had been a slight increase of the trade with Tibet from Rs. 12,55,700 (for 11 months) in 1894-95 to Rs. 17,03,060 in 1897-98, "the Trade Regulations have had no material, if any, effect on the trade. The increase appears to be mainly due to, and might have been expected from, the restoration of peace." They might also have added from the improvement of roads from the frontier.

98. The Government of India, in forwarding these reports to the Secretary of State on March 30th, 1899, remarked that "no real progress had yet been made towards the settlement of the frontier, while the stipulation as to trade had been practically inoperative." They added that they were prepared to revise the frontier so as to leave to Tibet the land in the neighbourhood of Gyagong, on condition that Phari should be thrown open to native traders from British India, and that these traders were not prevented from conducting business there directly with the Tibetans. The Viceroy also addressed the Chinese Resident at Lhasa on March 25th, 1899, in the above sense.

99. To this letter the Chinese Resident replied, on April 22nd, from Yatung that the frontier had been carelessly laid down in the Treaty; and that he was under the impression that the Tibetans would strongly object to having the mart placed at Phari, but that on his return to Lhasa he would communicate His Excellency's wishes to the Tibetans. This, however, he never did, and no further answer to this proposal has ever been received, though the Tsungli Yamen, who had been addressed on the matter by the Minister at Peking in December 1899, stated that they had written to the Resident at Lhasa to enquire into the circumstances.

100. Various attempts were now made to open up direct communication with the Tibetans. Ugyen Kazi, the Bhutan Vakil, wrote a letter to the Dalai Lama

suggesting in general terms that a high Tibetan official should be sent to discuss frontier and trade matters. But the Dalai Lama's reply made no reference to the suggestion. It was not found possible to enter into communication by way of Burma and Yunan; nor through Nepal. But the Political Officer at Leh thought it might be feasible to despatch a letter from the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama through Gartok. A letter was accordingly sent in July 1900, but was returned in the following spring, the officials at Gartok writing that they had not dared to send it to Lhasa, as sending it would endanger their lives and necks. They added that in future "the Sahib should refrain from acts contrary to regulation, such as coming this side of the frontier and sending letters, which are practices which he should consider forbidden." The letter had, however, evidently been opened and read.

101. Another attempt was made in June 1901 to send a letter from the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama, this time by the hand of Ugyen Kazi. The Kazi reported that he had duly delivered it, but the general belief on the frontier is that he never did anything of the sort. At any rate, no reply was received, and thus the series of efforts to get into direct communication with the Tibetans proved fruitless.

102. As a consequence the Government of India, with the approval of the Secretary of State, decided to depute Mr. White to tour along the Sikkim frontier, and exclude the Tibetans from the grazing grounds at Gyagong. Mr. White arrived at Gyagong on June 26th, 1902, and informed certain Tibetan officials whom he met there that he had been ordered to lay down the boundary as shown in the convention of 1890, to which they replied that they had heard of the Treaty, but that it was invalid, as it had not been signed by any Tibetan. Mr. White, however, removed them from Gyagong and destroyed Tibetan block-houses erected there. He also toured along the frontier; surveyed it; ascertained the number of Tibetan sheep, yaks and goats grazing there, and reported the existence of a mutual understanding between the Sikkimese and the Tibetans, by which the former grazed their flocks in Tibet in the winter and the latter grazed their flocks in Sikkim in the summer.

RELATIONS OF TIBET WITH RUSSIA.

103. A new factor had meanwhile been introduced into the situation. Hitherto our interest in Tibet had been entirely connected with improving the facilities for trade. It now became apparent that Russia was also increasingly interesting herself in Tibetan affairs, and this naturally quickened our own interest in a country which adjoins our territories for hundreds of miles. A brief account therefore of the spread of Russian influence in Tibet becomes necessary to a proper comprehension of the existing situation.

104. Russia has, indeed, of late years shown increased attention to Tibet, yet her interest in the country has been of long standing. Even in 1783 Turner found the doings of the Russians were known to the Tibetans. "They were no strangers," he says, "to the reputation of the reigning Czarina (Catherine), her extent of dominion, and the commerce carried on with China. Many overtures, they told me, had been made on the part of Russia to extend her commerce to the internal parts of Tibet, but their disinclination to enter into any new foreign connection, and the watchful jealousy of the Chinese, had hitherto defeated every attempt of this nature."

105. For nearly a century later the Russians do not appear to have made any direct efforts to extend their influence to Tibet. But in 1872 began a series of military scientific expeditions into Tibet which with intervals have continued to the present year. These expeditions have never succeeded in reaching Lhasa, or, so far as can be gathered, in establishing any kind of diplomatic relations with the Lhasa authorities, but they have acquired a vast amount of information about the country, and have done much to spread Russian influence right down the eastern side of Tibet. The first of these military explorers was Colonel Prejevalsky, who in 1872-73 travelled through Tsaidain to the upper waters of the Yangtse in the direction of Lhasa. In 1876-77, and again in 1879-1884, the

same traveller explored the northern and north-eastern portions of Tibet. In 1889-90 Colonel Pievtsof explored the north-western corner. In 1893 Potanin travelled through the eastern portion. In 1900-02 Kozloff explored the north-eastern and eastern districts, and in the present year there is said to be a mine-prospecting expedition in Eastern Tibet. All of these expeditions have received especial encouragement from the Russian Government, and the personal interest of the late and present Czars. But each one has been turned back by the Tibetans before reaching Lhasa, and so far, at any rate, it is clear that the Lhasa authorities are determined to keep off Russian influence.

106. But quite lately Russian influence has been spreading itself in a much more insidious and much more effective manner than by open, staring expeditions. Since 1898 a number of Siberian Buriat Lamas, who are Asiatic Russians and who at the same time profess the Lamaist doctrines of Tibetan Buddhism, have visited Lhasa and succeeded, whether designedly or unconsciously, in influencing the Lamas of Lhasa in favour of Russia. The first of these visitors was a certain Dorjieff, a Russian Mongolian Buriat by birth, who had apparently for twenty years, since he was 35 years of age, been residing in one of the great monasteries at Lhasa as a Professor of Metaphysics, and who in 1898 returned to his native place in Mongolia, and from there visited St. Petersburg and Paris. In the following spring he once again appeared in Lhasa and "made a profuse distribution of money and presents, and thus ingratiated himself with the Dalai Lama and monks of Lhasa." He is reported by Mr. Walsh, the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, to have "acquired great influence over the Dalai Lama and induced him to cultivate the friendship of the Emperor of Russia in the same manner as the first Dalai Lama sought from the Chinese Emperor protection against both internal and foreign enemies of Tibet." He presented the Dalai Lama with a pamphlet containing an enumeration of the good acts of the Emperor Nicholas II in the Russian, Mongolian and Tibetan languages; he explained to the Grand Lama the many advantages which the Buddhist church would gain by friendship with so great a monarch, and represented that, if the Grand Lama visited the Russian capital, he might convert the Emperor to the Buddhist faith; he gave out that the English had conquered China, and that within a short time they would invade Tibet, and that it was therefore high time for the Grand Lama to save his country and the church by securing the friendly protection of the Emperor of Russia. The Grand Lama, attaching much weight to his representations, summoned his councillors to a conference and with their advice thrice called the National Assembly of the representatives of the church and chiefs of Tibet for an expression of their views on the subject of negotiating for the friendship of Russia. The National Assembly were not unanimous on the point, considering that the Russians, like the English, were not Buddhists, and that it was not known for certain whether China had collapsed altogether. The Grand Lama, however, with the advice of his councillors, decided to send Dorjieff to Russia to convey his greetings and to thank the Emperor for his great exertions for increasing the happiness of the world. Dorjieff took with him besides valuable presents the consecrated cushionseat on which the Grand Lama sat on the occasion of his ordination; the object of his so doing is believed to be a preliminary step to the Grand Lama visiting the capital of the Tsar eventually.

107. Dorjieff accordingly proceeded to Russia and was received by the Czar on October 13th, 1900, in the Palace at Livadia. But all that it was possible to ascertain for certain about this mission was that he brought with him "a long document supposed to be from the Dalai Lama."

108. He returned to Lhasa by the Urga route in February 1901, but left Lhasa once more in April of the same year and proceeded by way of Nepal to Bombay, thence to Odessa. He was with his suite of Tibetans received again by the Czar at St. Petersburg on July 6th, 1901; and was described in the *Messages Officiel* as the "Envoy Extraordinary of the Dalai Lama of Tibet." He and his companions were also received on the same day by the Empress. They also paid visits to Count Lamsdorff and M. Witte. On July 10th the British Ambassador reported that he had had a conversation with Count Lamsdorff

on the subject of this mission, and that His Excellency had said that " although the Tibetan visitors had been described as Envoys Extraordinary of the Dalai Lama, their mission could not be regarded as having any political or diplomatic character. The offices and attributes of a Dalai Lama were more of a Buddhist pontiff, who was, he understood, even venerated by the Buddhists, of whom there was a very large number in the Russian Empire, as an incarnation of Buddha. The mission was of the same character as those sent by the Pope to the faithful in foreign lands." Dorjjeff had brought Count Lamsdorff an autograph letter from the Dalai Lama which Count Lamsdorff spoke of as being of a purely complimentary nature. On another occasion, as reported by Sir C. Scott on July 4th, Count Lamsdorff said that Dorjjeff " came occasionally to Russia with the object, he believed, of making money collections for his Order from the numerous Buddhists in the Russian Empire."

109. The Russian Press, however, certainly considered this mission had a political character. An Odessa paper spoke of it as an " Extraordinary Mission from the Dalai Lama of Tibet, which is proceeding to St. Petersburg with diplomatic instructions of importance"; and described its chief object to be " a *rapprochement* and the strengthening of good relations with Russia. The Extraordinary Mission will, among other things, raise the question of the establishment in St. Petersburg of a permanent Tibet Mission for the maintenance of good relations with Russia. In Russia, there are some thousands of Lamas, or monks of the Buddhist cult." In the *Novoe Vremya* a certain Dr. Badmaieff (whose connection with Tibet will be presently described) wrote: " The whole world is convinced that Russia is doing everything to uphold the integrity of China; and therefore the Tibetans, subjects of the Emperor of China (who have) come to pray for assistance against any attack on Tibet, will certainly be received with welcome." In another interview published in the *St. Petersburg Gazette* he says that " Tibet is really quite accessible to the Russians, but that the object of the mission is to make it more so. He fears that the English, who have now established themselves so firmly in Kashmir, may anticipate Russia in that country." The *Novoe Vremya* said that " the reappearance of the Tibetan Mission in Russia proves that the favourable impressions carried back by Dorjjeff to his home from his previous mission have confirmed the Dalai Lama in his intention of contracting the friendliest relations with Russia.....A *rapprochement* with Russia must seem to him the most natural step, as Russia is the only power able to counteract the intrigues of Great Britain, who has so long been endeavouring to gain admission, and only awaits an opportunity to force an entrance."

110. But the mission seems to have had yet another object, for the British Ambassador reports on August 7th that the Japanese Minister had informed him that he had been told by the Chinese Minister that " one of the chief objects of the mission was to ask the Russian Government not to allow the despatch of Russian exploring expeditions into Tibet."

111. The practical results of this mission are given in a letter dated November 10th, 1902, from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Mr. Hardinge states, from secret information obtained from a reliable source, he had reason to believe that an arrangement, though not a Treaty, exists between the Russian Government and the Dalai Lama. According to his informant, " the Russian Government to a certain extent hold the purse-strings of the Dalai Lama, since every year considerable collections are made among the Buriats and Russian co-religionists of the Dalai Lama, and these are forwarded to him in Tibet. In return for the non-interference of the Russian Government with the religion and collections of Buddhists in Russian territory, the Dalai Lama has conceded to the Russian Government the right to have a Consular Officer in Tibet, and has agreed to the recognition of the orthodox religion and to its free exercise in Tibet, and at the same time to prevent the use of any other religion, and more particularly of the Roman Catholic religion. The arrangement in ques-

tion is said to have received the approval of the Council of Ministers, and the greatest secrecy is observed in connection with it. In order, however, not to give offence to His Majesty's Government, who would naturally demand similar rights from the Tibetan Government, it has been decided not to appoint a Consular Officer, but to send a duly-accredited secret agent who would be able to use his influence with the Tibetan Government for the furtherance of Russian aims. The Agent who has been selected to fill this post is a certain Mr. Badengieff."

112. Some corroboration of the above information is afforded by the statement of a Lhasa trader who reported the return of the mission to Lhasa in November 1901 and that there were reports in Lhasa "that a treaty had been entered into with Russia by which Russia undertakes to protect Tibet from any attempt of the English to enter the country." Another trader also referred to Dorjjeff's having "brought about the treaty with Russia." It was further reported from Lhasa that the Chinese Amban had come to know of the object of the mission and had informed the Minister of the Grand Lama "of his displeasure at the secret agreement which the Grand Lama had been led to enter into with Russia." What became of Dorjjeff himself is not quite clear. His mission returned to Lhasa and it was assumed that he had too. But the *Messages Officiel* records his having had a second interview with the Czarina on December 11th, 1901, and according to the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg he returned to Siberia and not to Lhasa.

113. Another Mongolian visitor to Lhasa was Norzanoff who arrived in Calcutta from Marseilles on the 6th March 1900. He described himself as belonging to the Post and Telegraph Department, Sangata, Stavopolsk Government and a native of Hulka [Khalka] in Mongolia; and he possessed a passport from the Governor of Stavopolsk. He was further described as a Saissung of the Kalmak tribe in a letter of introduction from Prince Outomsky, Editor of the St. Petersburg *Riga Veidomosti*, who said he was a member of the Russian Geographical Society undertaking a journey to Tibet both "on a religious pilgrimage and in the interests of science and commerce." He had also a letter of introduction to the French Consul at Calcutta from a Professor in Paris. He said that he had once before been through Tibet to Calcutta *via* Darjiling and intended to proceed again to Tibet with a case of presents for the Dalai Lama in gratitude for previous kind treatment, and as an offering to the head of the Buddhist Church. He was deported to Odessa under the orders of the Government of India in August 1900. He however got into Tibet again, by Urga with Dorjjeff and he was one of Dorjjeff's Mission to Russia in June 1901, and he brought back to Europe a photograph of Lhasa which was published in the Journal of the Paris Geographical Society.

114. The latest Mongolian traveller in Tibet is the Buriat Lama Tsybikoff, who resided for a year in Lhasa, 1900-01, and brought back to Russia an account of the customs and manners. He is a native of the Baikal region, a Buddhist by religion and a graduate of the University of St. Petersburg.

115. Besides these, however, there is a mysterious individual named Badmaieff, who is evidently, from the way he is interviewed by the Russian newspapers, looked upon as an authority upon Tibet and who is thought to have visited Lhasa in 1899, but who is described by the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg as a Mongolian by birth and a convert to Christianity; who has passed his examinations as a doctor of medicine, who has more than once revisited the land of his birth on the confines of Tibet, and has succeeded in maintaining some sort of connection with the Dalai Lama, although he himself has never been to Lhasa. There seems reason to believe that either Dorjjeff and Norzanoff or at any rate the latter was the agent or emissary of Badmaieff who was at one time at Urga.

116. Lastly, three Tibetans are reported by Mr. White in August 1902 to have gone to Russia from Lhasa to enquire if, in the case of any disturbance, Russia would render assistance to the Tibetans.

117. These are the men who have, whether with or without the official cognisance of the Russian Government, established a connection of some kind between the Dalai Lama and the Russian Government. Besides this there are good grounds for suspecting that the Russian Government have attempted to conclude a secret treaty with the Chinese Government in regard to Tibet. Sir E. Satow reported from Peking in August 1902 "a rumour put forward designedly by the Russo-Chinese Bank in pressing that China may transfer her interests in Tibet to Russia if Russia will promise to uphold the integrity of China." Sir E. Satow believed that "the Russian Minister had hinted that an agreement with China on the question of Tibet was desired by Russia." On September 8th he saw the Foreign Board who strongly denied that there was any agreement. Sir E. Satow thought, however, that there was little doubt that the Agent of the Russo-Chinese Bank had talked to Yung-Lu, and that, in spite of their denials, Prince Ching and Chu, another Member of the Board, knew about it.

118. In August the exiled reformer, Kang-Yu-Wai, reported to the Government of Bengal that the Empress of China and Yung-Lu had handed over Tibet to Russia in return for protection, and had given the Russians permission to mine; to construct railways; to build forts in Tibet; and to govern the country with Russians assisted by Chinese counsellors, provided the Russians would protect the monasteries and religion and admit Chinese trade.

119. In September 1902 Sir E. Satow telegraphed that a Manchu on the Staff of the Resident at Lhasa had reported to the Grand Council that Russian activity in Tibet had recently been very great, and it looked very much as if they contemplated seizing the sovereign power over the country.

120. The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg also reported on October 2nd that the Chinese Minister in conversation with him had alluded to "the interest, whether simply geographical and commercial, or political which Russia seemed to take in Tibet, and the mysterious emissary who had visited St. Petersburg a year ago."

121. Mr. White reported in November that the Amban at Lhasa had received orders from Yung-Lu to prevent at all costs the negotiations between India and Tibet till the spring of 1903 when Russian troops would occupy Lhasa. This information having been brought by Sir E. Satow to the notice of Prince Ching, he replied that he had heard reports to the same effect. He had asked the Russian Minister what foundation there was in them, and had been told in reply that Russia had no desire to encroach upon Tibet, but the Minister seemed to acknowledge that the Buddhists in Russian territory had come to some sort of arrangement with their co-religionists in Tibet, though with this the Russian Government had nothing to do.

122. Yung-Lu recently died and with his death have ended the rumours of an agreement between Russia and China to hand over Tibet to the former.

OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS RUSSIA AND CHINA IN REGARD TO TIBET.

123. The various reports regarding the dealings of the Russians with the Tibetans, and with the Chinese regarding Tibet, naturally aroused the attention of His Majesty's Government, and representations on the subject were made to both the Russian and Chinese Governments.

124. Sir C. Scott, acting under orders from His Majesty's Government, informed Count Lamsdorff on September 2nd, 1901, that his statement to the effect that no political or diplomatic significance could be attached to the mission had been communicated to the Government of India and had been received with satisfaction. "His Majesty's Government," Sir C. Scott added, "would naturally not regard with indifference any proceedings that might have a tendency to alter or disturb the existing status of Tibet; and felt no doubt that the Russian Government was animated by similar sentiments." His Excellency expressed his assent.

125. Sir E. Satow, on September 8th, 1902, informed Prince Ching that "Great Britain and China, being the sole territorial neighbours of Tibet, are alone entitled to take an interest in Tibetan affairs, and the maintenance of the *status quo* is accordingly the concern of both Powers. It was therefore with great surprise and concern that His Majesty's Government had heard from more than one quarter that an arrangement had been concluded, or was under discussion, between China and a third Power, by which suzerainty over Tibet was to be transferred to the latter." "His Majesty's Government looked upon this matter as being of so serious a character that they had instructed him," added Sir E. Satow, "to state formally that should any agreement affecting the political status of Tibet be entered into by China with another Power, His Majesty's Government would infallibly be compelled to protect their own interests by occupying such Chinese territory as might be necessary for this purpose."

126. The Russian Embassy in London having on February 2nd, 1903, made representations to the Foreign Office regarding a supposed military expedition in the Chumbi valley and referred to the necessity which might arise for the Russian Government having to safeguard its interests in those regions, Lord Lansdowne replied that there was no foundation in the report, and that he could not conceive why Russia should evince her interest in this manner. The Russian Ambassador said Russia had no political design in Tibet and he presumed we had not. Lord Lansdowne replied that we certainly had no desire to annex Tibetan territory; but that it was natural that the Indian Government should desire to push Indian trade into the country and they would no doubt take whatever measures seemed to them necessary for this purpose.

127. Again, on February 18th, Lord Lansdowne informed the Russian Ambassador that the interest of India in Tibet was of a very special character. Lhasa was very close to India, but very distant from Russia, and any sudden display of Russian interest or activity in the regions immediately adjoining British territory could scarcely fail to have a disturbing effect upon the population, or to create the impression that British influence was receding and that of Russia making rapid advances into regions which had hitherto been regarded as altogether outside of her sphere of influence. Lord Lansdowne then proceeded to say that reports had been received that Russia had lately concluded agreements for the establishment of a Russian protectorate over Tibet and also that she intended to establish Russian Agents and Consular Officers at Lhasa. He therefore thought it of the utmost importance that as His Excellency had disclaimed on the part of Russia all political designs upon Tibet, he should be in a position to state whether these rumours were or were not without foundation. The Russian Ambassador promised to make specific enquiries of his Government as to the truth of these statements. Lord Lansdowne then went on to say "as we were much more closely interested than Russia in Tibet, it followed that should there be any display of Russian activity in that country, we should be obliged to reply by a display of activity not only equivalent to but exceeding that made by Russia. If they sent a mission or expedition, we should have to do the same, but in greater strength."

128. It was not till April 8th that the Russian Ambassador was able to give Lord Lansdowne a reply. His Excellency then officially assured Lord Lansdowne that "there was no convention about Tibet, either with Tibet itself, or with China, or with any one else, nor had the Russian Government any agents in that country or any intention of sending agents or missions there." Count Benckendorff went on to say that "although the Russian Government had no designs whatever upon Tibet, they could not remain indifferent to any serious disturbance of the *status quo* in that country. Such a disturbance might render it necessary for them to safeguard their interests in Asia, not that even in this case they would desire to interfere in the affairs of Tibet as their policy *ne viserait la Tibet en aucun cas*, but they might be obliged to take measures elsewhere. They regarded Tibet as forming a part of the Chinese Empire, in the integrity of which they took an interest."

129. The Russian Ambassador hoped there was no question of any action on our part in regard to Tibet which might have the effect of raising questions of this kind. Lord Lansdowne informed him that we had no idea of annexing the country, but he was well aware that it immediately adjoined our frontier, that we had treaties with the Tibetans, and a right to trade facilities. If these were denied to us, and if the Tibetans did not fulfil their treaty obligations, it would be absolutely necessary that we should insist on our rights. In cases of this kind, when an uncivilised country adjoined the possessions of a civilised power, it was inevitable that the latter should exercise a certain amount of local predominance. Such a predominance belonged to us in Tibet. But it did not follow from this that we had any designs upon the independence of the country.

THE PRESENT SITUATION.

130. From a consideration of the foregoing the broad outlines of the present situation come prominently forward. Perhaps the most noticeable feature is the inveterate opposition of the Tibetans—or rather not of the Tibetans as a whole, but of the Lhasa monks who hold the country in bonds of iron—to all intercourse with the outside. There is good reason to believe that the common people and the trading community would be glad enough to see intercourse between India and Tibet established. They have no fanatical feelings against either Christians, Hindus or Mohamedans: they are naturally good-tempered and easy-going: and those who trade know well the advantage of increased facilities for intercourse. Even the Dalai Lama himself, influenced by the insinuating Dorjjeff, and perhaps also by a little pressure from the Russian Government in the matter of collections from Lamaist inhabitants of Russian territory, has gone to what a Tibetan would think an extreme length in writing autograph letters to the Czar and some of the high officials, and sending envoys to His Majesty. But the abbots and monks of the great monasteries at Lhasa, in whose hands, and not in the Dalai Lama's, lies the real authority in Tibet, are inexorable. In spite of the evident prepossession of the Dalai Lama and his Council in favor of an understanding with Russia, placing Tibet under her protection, they on the whole pronounced against it; and view the Dalai Lama with some disfavour for having any dealings at all with the Russians. And as for dealing with us, they will not hear of it for a moment. Even letters from the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama are ignominiously returned. Even a translation of a speech I made before the Chinese and Tibetan delegates, and which, with the approval of the former, I handed to the latter, was refused. All social intercourse between us and the Tibetan delegates here is absolutely forbidden from Lhasa; and they have been severely censured for even exchanging the usual formal presents with Mr. White and myself. The Tibetans throw up, in fact, a solid wall between us and them; and assume an attitude, not precisely of hostility, but of uncompromising obstruction—an attitude sanctioned by the tradition of centuries, and which, originally occasioned by a dread of conquest by the Mohamedan rulers of India, has been strengthened by an intense fear of the power of Europeans. The monks of Lhasa have now absolute and uncontrolled authority in Tibet. They have even a practical monopoly of trade. And they believe—probably with truth—that the advent of a European Power to Tibet would mean the decay of their authority over the people, and the doing away with their monopoly in trade.

131. The next most striking feature in the present situation is the falling away of Chinese authority over the Tibetans. They probably never had, or perhaps tried to have, much influence in the internal affairs of Tibet. But it is clear that they now have no authority in external affairs either. They were unable to get the Tibetans to withdraw from Sikkim in 1886; they were even unable, though they tried, to prevent the Tibetans from attacking us; they have been unable to make the Tibetans observe the Treaty made with us by the Chinese Amban; and now here at Khamba Jong they are quite incapable of preventing

the Tibetan delegates from taking up an attitude of which they themselves disapprove. The little regard the Tibetans now have for them is shown, too, in the impunity with which the Dalai Lama entered into direct correspondence with the Czar. The situation, indeed, is so delicate now that very little aggravation might induce the Tibetans to throw off the Chinese yoke altogether; and though many Chinese are anxious to restore their falling prestige in Tibet, I am informed by Mr. Wilton that when the new Chinese Resident applied to the Viceroy of Szechuan for some additional troops to take to Tibet, he was informed that so many troops had been taken away from the province to quell some disturbances in South China that none were available. In short, China, what with protecting herself from foreign aggression and upholding her authority from internal dissensions, is not in a position to coerce the Tibetans; and all she tries to do there is to keep things quiet and avoid causes for trouble.

132. As regards European contact with the country, if there is one thing more noticeable than another, it is the failure of our policy of patience and forbearance and the success of the Russian policy of active interest. Warren Hastings started on the latter system and was so far successful that he established extremely intimate and friendly relations with the Tashi Lama and the Regent at Shigatse; and for several years Indian traders were allowed to come and trade at Shigatse. But after him the policy of active interest was abandoned, and the Tibetans for nearly a century were left to themselves. Yet even a century's forbearance was not sufficient to convince them that we had no sinister designs upon their country; and when we proposed to send a peaceful mission to Tibet, they invaded a British Feudatory State. We still continued our policy of patience and forbearance both with them and with their Chinese suzerains. The only result today is that the Tibetans repudiate the Treaty we have made with their suzerains; that they have knocked down the boundary pillars which we and the Chinese put up in accordance with that Treaty; that they prevent all trade at the mart established under it, even though that mart is at the very extremity of Tibetan territory, and not really in Tibet proper; that they claim land inside the boundary laid down by the Treaty; that they refuse all communications, even from the Viceroy; and that they resolutely turn back all Englishmen who attempt to enter their country, and go so far as to barbarously kill a Minister who had befriended, not even an Englishman, but only a Bengali visitor to Tibet.

133. When such has been the result of patience and forbearance, it might be thought that a policy of active interest would lead to only worse results. Yet such has not been the experience of the Russians, and such, as has been seen, was not the experience of Warren Hastings; for in both cases the policy was applied with intelligence, with resolution, and with persistence. As a result, the inclination of the Tibetans today is to look to the Russians for protection against us rather than to us for protection against the Russians. One long century and more of patience and forbearance has not produced upon the minds of the Tibetans the impression that we are a peaceable people, who could be safely relied on to protect them against the frequent incursions of Russian military scientific expeditions, and possible political advances. While, on the other hand, the insidious active influence of the Russian Buriat agents in Lhasa has produced on the mind of the Dalai Lama and his councillors the idea that they may rely on the support of the Russians in the event of our ever pressing upon them. The proof of this may be found in the fact that when Captain Le Mesurier met the Chinese Amban at Yatung in 1899, the latter told him that if the "Indian Government insisted on the convention boundary, as understood by us, *the Tibetans would fall back on the support of Russia, who had already offered them assistance.*" Four Tibetan officials also, on the same occasion, informed Captain Le Mesurier that they had been offered assistance by Russia. Again, in connection with these present negotiations, the Tibetan delegates told a certain Englishman that, if the worst came to the worst, they could always rely upon the Russians and Mongols for support; and so obstinate is the attitude

They have taken up in these negotiations that he, the Englishman of all others who has the best means of knowing, says he is convinced they must be assured in their own minds of Russian support.

134. I do not mean to imply from what I have said that the Tibetans are ready to open their arms to the Russians and hand over their country to Russian control. Nothing is further from their thoughts; and they have kept out Russian exploring expeditions as rigorously as English expeditions from Lhasa. But from their seclusion they are very unsophisticated in political matters. They have had Chinese Emperors sending armies to repel their enemies; and they think that the Russian Emperor will do something of the same kind, or send them magic rifles, which will be able to counteract our own magic weapons. At any rate, whether it is directed by the Russian political authorities or whether it is, as the Russian political authorities aver, merely religious devotion towards the Dalai Lama displayed by the faithful adherents of His Holiness, and encouraged by the personal interest of the Czar and Czarina, and by the scientific support of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, the net result of Russian activity in Tibet is that Russian influence is now so strong in Lhasa that, directly we begin to negotiate with the Tibetans over matters of trade and an insignificant boundary question, we find the Tibetans arraying the Russians against us and fully confident of their support. This is the position which the Russians now hold in regard to us. They, in fact, hold the predominance which ought, by our geographical position, to belong to us. They will, no doubt, be checked from any immediate further efforts to increase their influence in Tibet by Lord Lansdowne's emphatic words, and this strong and timely warning has probably forestalled the declaration of a Russian Protectorate over Tibet, which, but for it, might have occurred in the near future. But no warning we can give the Russians in regard to their future action can do away with the effects of their action in the past. That mischief has been already done. Count Benckendorff may be perfectly sincere in his assurances that the Russian Government has no Convention with Tibet, and no intention of sending agents or missions there. But neither these assurances nor our warnings remove the influence so detrimental to us which has been established in Tibet by Russian subjects in the past.

135. So the present position is that Russian influence is predominant while ours is non-existent in a country which borders the Indian Empire for hundreds of miles, and is in contact with States like Nepal and Bhutan, over which our own political influence is not very great. No political danger from this exists at present. But there is nothing in the assurances of the Russian Government to prevent Russian military scientific expeditions still parading round Tibet or pious Siberian Lamas still presenting their grateful offerings to the Dalai Lama and carrying autograph letters from His Holiness to the Czar. Tibet undoubtedly possesses gold in considerable quantity, and that gold the Russians will continue to seek. I know from what they have themselves told me that they have a keen ambition to possess the gold of Tibet. A well-informed man like the Russian Consul at Kashgar has spoken to me of it with envy; and the great Russian explorer of Tibet, General Prejevalsky, in a letter to the Czar, when he was Czarewitch, spoke of Tibet as likely to become a second California. And, though this may be taken as an exaggeration, it undoubtedly represents what the Russians themselves think about Tibet. A Russian has already applied for a concession for mining rights and to construct a branch from the Siberian Railway to Tibet. And the Russian Minister at Peking last year informed Yung-Lu that a "Russian officer with a mining engineer and escort of soldiers is proceeding to Tibet to prospect for mines, and that the affair has been explained to the Dalai Lama." The Russian Government may then, as Count Benckendorff says, have no political designs on Tibet, and no intention to send agents or missions there. Still all this religious and commercial and scientific energy will continue to be directed towards the country. Concessions may be obtained; Siberian Lamas may gain a solid footing at Lhasa: and religious missions to the Czar may become perennial. Then, without

the Russian Government having so intended, they may find themselves, through the officially unrecognised energy of commercial, scientific and religious Russian subjects, in a position in Tibet which really would be a political danger to us.

136. Nobody supposes that Russia would ever be in a position to make a serious military invasion of India through Tibet. Her military forces are much too far distant and the country between is much too inhospitable for that to be a feasible operation. But the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal would not feel so comfortable in his summer resort at Darjiling, nor the tea-planters of the Duars so secure in their plantations, if there were a few hundred Cossacks at Lhasa, a score or two of Russian officers, and a plentiful supply of modern arms and ammunition with which to furnish any Tibetans and others who would care to try their fortunes in a raid on the plains of Bengal. Even when the Tibetans alone raided into Sikkim in 1886 many ladies were scared into running away from Darjiling. And the presence of Russians in a position of influence in Lhasa, though not portending a serious invasion of India from that quarter, would certainly entail upon us the necessity of increasing our garrisons on this frontier.

137. The real danger, however, in the establishment of Russian influence in Tibet is of a political nature. She could from there exert great influence on Kashmir, on Nepal, on Bhutan, and on the frontier tribes of Assam. She might draw from us many of the Gurkha soldiers from Nepal who now come to our ranks; and she might induce or force the Nepalese to keep most of the remainder in Nepal. And, while she would thus be reducing the amount of good material coming into our ranks, she would be compelling us to reorganise the whole of our mobilisation scheme, and place additional troops in Bengal and Assam for the defence of a frontier of 700 miles, which, with a European Power at Lhasa, we could not leave so entirely exposed as it is at present.

138. This is the real danger. Another, which is perhaps now remote, but which nearly came about, and which may even yet occur under certain circumstances, is the junction of the Russians and French across Asia. When I was at Kashgar in 1891 I gathered from the French traveller Dutvueil de Rhins, who was staying with me, that this was, then at any rate, an idea of the French. And I believe the French traveller Bonvalot has publicly given expression to the same idea. The former traveller had lived for many years in Indo-China, and the ambition of his life was to work up from there to Tibet. Eventually, under the auspices of the French Government, he came round by Turkestan to Tibet. But his dream was to work up French influence from Indo-China to the Tibetan border. The efforts of the French to acquire a predominant position in Yunnan and Szechuan are too very well known. So that, if they succeed there, and the Russians succeed in establishing themselves in Tibet, the Russian and French spheres of influence really would join north and south across Asia. And, as a slight indication that Russia and France are working together in this matter, it is worthy of note that Norzanoff came to India from Marseilles and with introductions not from the London but from the Paris Geographical Society, and not to the British authorities, but to the French Consul at Calcutta, although he does not appear to have been able to speak a word of French.

139. This danger is, however, now remote, for the French have been disappointed in their schemes in Szechuan, and if Russian influence is excluded from Tibet, there seems small prospect of their being able to establish any considerable influence north of their present possessions.

THE PRESENT OBJECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

140. I pass now to a consideration of the immediate objects of the present Commission. His Majesty's Government concur with the Government of India in wishing to promote trade facilities in Tibet, and to ensure that the Tibetans should not be able to avoid or repudiate obligations entered into on their behalf in any fresh Treaty or Convention. But they desire to confine the negotiations to frontier and grazing questions, and trade relations; and they do not wish that

he location of a Political Agent either at Lhasa or Gyantse should form part of our proposals.

141. I have accordingly been directed to proceed here to Khamba Jong to negotiate with representatives of the Chinese and Tibetan Governments. It has been intimated to me that it may be possible for the Government of India to make concessions to the Tibetans in regard to the frontier, in return for compliance on their part with our wishes in regard to other matters; and it is suggested that it would be desirable to arrange for the establishment of an open mart at Gyantse, to which mart Government would be free, as in the case of Yatung, to send officers to reside and watch the conditions of British trade. Lastly, it is pointed out to me that the provision of guarantees for the observance of such agreements as may be concluded is a matter of the first importance. One guarantee is the representation of the Tibetan Government on the Commission; and it is expected that other means of securing the desired result may present themselves to me. Free communication between the Government of India and the authorities at Lhasa; and arrangements for annual meetings between British and Tibetan officials for the due settlement of the trade and frontier difficulties that may occur are also matters which Government wish should be considered in the coming negotiations.

TRADE PROSPECTS IN TIBET.

142. There is a perhaps natural inclination to exaggerate the importance of trade with Tibet. But, from what I have said of the natural resources of the country and the style of living of the people, it should, I think, be evident that the trade possibilities are considerable. Where there is so much gold, and besides gold other mineral wealth in no small quantity; where wool is produced in such quantity and of such fine quality; where the people are in a fairly advanced state of civilisation and have a natural inclination for trade; where the upper classes live in considerable style; and where the natural riches of the country are augmented by the flow of religious offerings from outside,—the trade possibilities are worthy of serious attention.

143. "Tibet," says Turner, "has from time immemorial been the resort of merchants. Necessity has begotten a commerce with foreign countries, which, however, is but languidly conducted by a people naturally slothful and indolent. The soil and climate of Tibet being favourable to the production of few commodities, render it a proper field for a variety of mercantile projects. But an example of industry is wanting; when men once become acquainted with the pleasures of luxury and the profits of commerce, they will be aroused from their apathy; and new objects of opulence and ease, of which they never dreamt before, being presented to their view, will raise in them a desire for a more splendid way of life than their ancestors enjoyed, and will stimulate them to an investigation and improvement of their natural resources, which at present are even by themselves but imperfectly understood.... Though the soil of Tibet is, in its greatest extent, unimprovable by cultivation; and though the features of the country are strongly expressive of poverty, yet whatever is wanting to the people from a defect in fertility or in the skill of artists, they possess ample means of obtaining through the abundant riches of the earth. Their mines and minerals are capable of opening to them such inexhaustible sources of wealth, as to be alone sufficient to purchase everything of which they stand in need."

144. The investigations made during the century which has passed since Turner wrote this to Warren Hastings have confirmed the accuracy of his statements. The mineral wealth of Tibet is established. If the Lamas saw the advantage of it, they would release their restrictions on mining and obtain the wealth with which to purchase the outside articles of commerce. And if they do not of their own accord open more mines, they will probably within the next few years be driven into it by the force of outside pressure, from the north at any rate. Gold has an immensely attractive power and now it is becoming so well known that Tibet is rich in gold; and now that Russia is pressing so close on to it; the

day cannot be so far distant when the gold and silver of Tibet begin to flow from the earth, and afford the people the means of purchasing outside products.

145. Their wool, too, affords another means. Immense quantities might be produced on the vast plains of Tibet, and about the quality all who have seen the best Kashmir shawls may satisfy themselves. Five lakhs of rupees' worth are already exported to Bengal and more to the Punjab and Kashmir. Other minor products which they might export, in exchange for needful articles from abroad, are borax, musk, salt, hides, yak-tails and rhubarb, and they might drive down live stock,—sheep, goats, ponies and mules to the hill states and hill districts bordering the plains of India.

146. These are their means for purchasing. What they stand in need of are cotton cloth, broadcloth, chintz, cutlery and iron-ware, copper, indigo and dyes, tea, tobacco and sugar; and they also like to buy pearls, coral, and emeralds. Of these the most important is cotton cloth, of which $2\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of rupees worth are annually imported from Bengal. "The Tibetans of all classes," says Sarat Chandra Das, "have of late years taken largely to the use of cotton for inner garments, for the lining of their robes and trousers, and for screens and ceilings. The demand for cotton stuff is really great, and the Nepalese traders sell cotton fabrics at 100 to 150 per cent. profit. The increase of the wool trade will fast increase the demand for cotton in Tibet, as the Tibetans will not care to weave wool into cloth at the extreme disadvantage of selling it below cost price. A thick woollen *choga* will sell at one-third of the price of the raw wool required to make it. Hence cotton cloth will fill the Tibetan houses as soon as the exportation of wool increases." What Sarat Chandra Das here describes is the usual course which is followed in all such countries. When the people discover the real value of wool, and the cheapness of cotton cloth, they give up clothing themselves in their rough home-made woollen garments: exchange their raw wool for the cheaper cotton goods and (for, say a few metal household utensils and agricultural implements added on) clothe themselves in cotton instead of woollen garments and have some proper cooking utensils and serviceable hoes and plough blades to the good as well. Thus both the people and our traders reap an advantage. There is no reason—except the obstruction of the Lhasa monks—why a great and beneficial change from home-made woollen to foreign-made cotton garments should not take place in Tibet, and through it the Tibetans have tin or copper in place of earthenware cooking-pots; and iron instead of wooden blades to their ploughs, while our woollen, cotton and iron manufacturers would also reap an advantage; and Tibetan yak-owners put in their pockets a useful little sum for the carriage of the goods. The only possible disadvantage appears to be the prospect of the poor Tibetans catching cold by changing woollen for cotton garments. They will, however, continue to wear sheepskin coats in the winter, and like the Chinese and other inhabitants of cold climates they can wear wadded clothes if necessary. Cotton goods and ironware ought therefore in the future to have a great sale among all classes, and among the better classes broadcloth which is much worn and appreciated by them.

147. Another article which they ought to purchase from us largely with their raw products is tea. There are tea-gardens all over the hillsides round Darjiling and in the neighbouring Terai, only a few marches from the Tibetan border. The Tibetans are large consumers of tea: and one would naturally think that as a consequence there would be a considerable import of tea to Tibet. Unfortunately the enquiries of the Indian Tea Association as reported in a letter dated April 2nd, 1902, from the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, showed that "practically no Indian tea is drunk in Tibet; there is a large trade in tea.....but it is confined entirely to the Chinese product." The reason for this appears to be that, according to the Trade Regulations, a duty not exceeding that levied upon China tea imported into Great Britain might be levied at Yatung, *i.e.*, 6*d.* per lb., which, as the teas drunk in Tibet are of a very inferior description, would be equal to about 150 to 200 per cent. on their value. Another and more cogent reason still, is that the Lamas do their best to discourage its importation. One or two attempts were

made to import tea into Tibet, but they were unsuccessful " as the men declined to accept the tea on the ground that if they sold it, they would be punished by the Lamas."

148. That Indian tea could, if it were fairly treated, and if it were manufactured to suit the taste of the people, supplant Chinese tea there is not the smallest doubt. A glance at the map will show how very much nearer the tea districts of Darjiling are to Lhasa than Lhasa is to the nearest Chinese province of Szechuan. But throughout the negotiations with respect to the Trade Regulations the Chinese and Tibetan officials were strongly opposed to permitting trade in Indian tea under any conditions whatsoever. As a consequence Indian tea has at present no chance in Tibet. The Tibetans are made to pay more for their tea than they have any need to ; and our planters lose a source of profit. But that the opportunities for trade are great we may assume when we hear that " a certain quantity, said to amount to 3,000 mule-loads, is imported annually by the Lhasa Government " alone , and that Bower was astonished at the enormous amount of tea which he saw being transported from China. The present consumption of tea in Tibet is estimated, says Captain O'Connor, at over twenty million pounds.

TRADE ROUTES TO TIBET.

149. These are the articles—tea, cotton-goods, broadcloth, ironware, etc., which Tibet mostly needs, and what she has to give in exchange, wool, hides, gold and silver, and live-stock, have already been detailed. The routes by which their interchange can be effected have now to be mentioned. A full description of these has been given by Captain O'Connor in his note on the Trade Routes between India and Tibet, dated April 13th, 1903 : it will be sufficient, therefore, to here mention only the most important characteristics of each—

I.—The principal trade route at present used is that leading through Sikkim over the Jelap-La to the Chumbi valley, and thence by Gyantse to either Lhasa or Shigatse. The distance of Lhasa from the railway at Siliguri by the route is about 350 miles. The route leads over a succession of very steep ascents and descents to the Jelap-La, which is 14,390 feet high, and which is closed by snow nearly every year for periods varying from a few days to a fortnight. The road on either side of this pass is very steep. Through the Chumbi valley the route is fairly good, grass and fire-wood are plentiful and supplies for men and animals can be procured. The pass, Tang-La, at the head of this valley into Tibet proper, is 15,700 feet high, but remarkably easy, the ascent to it and descent from it being very gradual. From here to Lhasa the road presents no difficulty whatever, passing down over and up another broad, open and almost level valley. Plenty of villages are met with and ample supplies for trading caravans are procurable.

II.—A second route through Sikkim leads to Tibet following up the Tista river to near its source, and crossing the Kongra Lama Pass, 17,000 feet high, to Khamba Jong. By this route Lhasa is about 390 miles from Siliguri. Hopes had at one time been entertained of this proving a useful trade route, but the Tibetans have a rooted objection to it. It is supposed to be unhealthy : the rainfall along it is terribly heavy ; fodder and supplies are scarce, and while working during the rainy season is nearly impassable ; by the time the rains are over, the grass on the Tibetan side and near the passes has begun to wither from the cold. The Shigatse traders who should use the route seem to prefer to go down the Chumbi valley, though it is somewhat longer.

III.—The actually shortest route between India and Lhasa is that from Odalguri in Assam, and thence *viâ* Tawang. By this route Lhasa is only 311 miles distant : but the road appears to be very bad and to be impassable during the rains.

IV.—A route leads through Nepal from Khatimandu to Kirong in Tibet, and thence to Shigatse and Lhasa. This is used by the Nepalese traders: but as it cannot be used by British Indian traders, and is moreover much longer than the Sikkim route, it need not be more than mentioned here.

V.—A difficult route leads from Kumaon over the Niti Pass to the Manasarowar Lake district.

VI.—A route through Simla up the Sutlej valley to the district round the same lake. This is called the Hindustan-Tibet road, and up to the Tibetan frontier is a good mule road. It leads, however, to a very sparsely populated part of Tibet, and has not in consequence the same importance as the routes lying further east.

VII.—For a similar reason the route leading from Ladak to Lhasa, though easy, has a minor importance.

150. These are the principal routes from India to Tibet in use at present. But it is worthy of note for future consideration, when political conditions may change, that Tibet may be entered by two ways without crossing any pass at all. The first way is up the river known as the Kosi in Nepal and the Yaru here in Tibet; and the second is up the Brahmaputra. In the distant future roads may be made up these river valleys. But, at the present moment, the most serviceable route into Tibet is that leading through the Chumbi valley to Gyantse; and a very satisfactory point to notice about this route is that the worst part of it lies in British protected territory and can therefore be improved at will.

CHOICE OF NEW TRADE MART IN TIBET.

151. On this Chumbi valley route into Tibet is the important trade mart of Gyantse, from which branch roads to Shigatse on the one hand and to Lhasa on the other. The explorer A—k says there are here about a thousand dwelling-houses and a large market in which are met traders from Nepal and China. This market is said by Sarat Chandra Das to be inferior to Shigatse in importance and in the variety of articles for sale; and as we formerly had and used permission for natives of India to trade at Shigatse, we might well ask that Shigatse should be fixed as the new mart in place of Yatung. But Gyantse has the advantage of being at the junction of the road to Lhasa and would on that account be in all probability a more suitable place to fix on. It is situated in a fertile valley the length of which is from 60 to 70 miles, and the average width 10 miles, every inch of which, according to Sarat Chandra Das, is cultivated.

MEANS FOR SECURING THE OBJECTS OF GOVERNMENT.

152. Gyantse is, therefore, in all particulars a suitable place to fix on as the trade mart in the place of Yatung. But we may take it for granted that, even with the concessions in regard to the boundary line and to grazing that we are prepared to give the Tibetans, we shall have the utmost difficulty in inducing them to accept Gyantse as the new trade mart; and having got them to accept it, that we shall have still greater difficulty in making them observe the conditions of trading which, after our experience at Yatung, it would be absolutely necessary to impose upon them.

153. As is observed in my instructions, "if the new trade mart at the latter place (Gyantse) is not to be reduced to a nullity from the start, and if any real advance is to be made in our commercial relations with Tibet, it should be possible to secure the application to Gyantse of the provision in clauses I and II of the Regulations of 1893, under which it was agreed that the Government of India should be free to send officers to reside at Yatung to watch the condition of British trade at that mart. Without some such supervision it is easy to foresee that whatever new arrangements are made may at an early date be rendered nugatory." And such there is not the smallest shadow of a doubt would be the case if the Tibetans were not very sharply and constantly looked after and made to absolutely fear breaking the conditions of trade. It would be

useless to establish a trade mart in Tibet at all now when the monk influence is so unfriendly to us and Chinese influence so weak unless we can have the mart under the close supervision of a British official ; unless we can communicate directly on trade matters with the Tibetan officials ; and unless the Lhasa Government can feel positive danger in breaking through the new treaty as they have broken through the old.

154. For consider what the present situation is. The power of the country is entirely in the hands of the monks, and they are opposed from the bottom of their souls to the admittance of even natives of India to Tibet. At the present moment the attitude they are taking up is that they will not negotiate even here only 14 miles from the frontier, and will oppose by force any attempt by us to move further into the interior of the country. They believe themselves to be supported not only by Heaven but by the Russians ; and as they suspect that the establishment of a trade mart would be but the prelude of our insinuating our way further into the country, and establishing an influence there which, if allowed, would diminish their own, and as moreover they have at present a trade monopoly and keep a great deal of the trade in their own hands, they are absolutely determined to exclude us. The Nepalese and Kashmir merchants, too, who have enjoyed a monopoly of the Indian trade for so many years, and who must therefore look with anything but a favourable eye on attempts to improve the trade by the more direct route through Sikkim, will certainly encourage the Lhasa monks in thwarting our efforts. And in the matter of encouraging Indian trade we can hardly expect the Chinese to be very enthusiastic, as the improvement of Indian means the decline of Chinese trade.

155. The monk influence therefore must be overcome if we are ever to place our trade with Tibet on a proper footing. How shall this be effected? One way which has been suggested for securing that end is by giving the great Lamas and abbots of the monasteries handsome presents and liberal sums of money. This in actual practice is very difficult to do ; and, if done, would not, I think, lead to any permanently useful result. The power in Tibet is not concentrated in one man ; and the masses of monks living in those monasteries at Lhasa are so numerous, and so deeply bigoted in this matter, that the throwing of a few thousands of rupees among them would produce about as much result as throwing the rupees into the sea.

156. But they might be approached by us in the same way as the Russians have approached them, it may be thought. Unfortunately, closer to Lhasa as we are in point of distance, the Lhasa monks are less accessible to us than they are to the Russians ; for while there are thousands of Russian subjects who look to the Dalai Lama as their spiritual head, there are only a few hundreds of British subjects, and those not very intelligent or likely to be useful. The people of Burma and Ceylon, though Buddhists, are not Lamaists. And it will be remembered what difficulty there was in finding a man simply to carry a letter to the Dalai Lama, and how useless the man found proved to be. I know of no one who could carry out the same kind of mission as Dorjief did for the Russians. And I doubt, too, whether even Dorjief would have succeeded in inducing the National Assembly to agree to the establishment of a trade mart under the supervision of a European officer.

157. Again, it may be thought that if some of the really big men from Lhasa could meet the Commission we could reason with them ; explain the situation to them in a friendly and reasonable manner ; tell them how absurd were the ideas they had that we ever wished to annex the country ; show them the mutual advantages of more unrestricted intercourse ; and by friendly personal intercourse disarm suspicion. That we have tried. There are here two high officials from Lhasa. I explained our case to them in detail, and even went so far as to say that Government would be prepared to make them concessions on the frontier provided they would be reasonable in regard to trade. But they refused even to report my words to Lhasa ; they have declined every sort of personal intercourse ; and have been severely censured from Lhasa for exchanging formal presents. And this although I had shown them most clearly the unreasonableness of their general attitude, seeing that Tibetans were allowed to come down freely

to India ; to trade, reside, or travel there and to visit their sacred places ; and that everywhere they went they received protection for themselves and their goods ; whereas no Englishman, and even no native of India, was allowed by them to show his nose inside Tibet.

158. But if we could get beyond these mere officials and get personal access to the actual Head of the Tibetan Government, perhaps then we might be able to get the Tibetan Government to listen to reason ? That also we have tried. Two letters were addressed by the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama, but both were returned. I tried to approach him through the Chinese Amban, and, hearing that he was about to visit Shigatse, asked the Amban to endeavour to arrange a meeting between His Holiness and myself in order that I might have an opportunity of explaining the position of the Government of India fully and clearly to him. I at the same time asked for and received the permission of the Government of India, in the improbable event of such a meeting taking place, to assure His Holiness that we had no designs whatever upon the independence of Tibet. The only result of my application to the Amban was a reply discourteously addressed to the Viceroy instead of to me, in which he said that the Tibetans did not have friendly intercourse with foreign people.

159. Perhaps, though, the whole people may not be united in their opposition and there may be jealousy between Shigatse and Lhasa which may turn out to our advantage ? There certainly is jealousy between the two centres. But, after all, the great monastery at Tashi-Lumpo, near Shigatse, contains only 3,800 monks, whereas the great monasteries of Lhasa contain, in all, over 16,000 monks ; and the influence of Lhasa is in consequence all-powerful. A deputy from Shigatse came here to request our withdrawal from the province of which Shigatse is the Capital. He informed me the Tashi Lama was in trouble with the Lhasa authorities on account of our presence here ; and he trusted that we would get him out of this trouble by at once withdrawing across the frontier. I explained to him, in as friendly a way as possible, how I had nothing whatever to do with fixing the place of meeting for the negotiations ; how this was arranged between my Government and the Chinese Government ; how I had received orders to come here ; and how impossible it was therefore for me to now go against those orders. At the same time I sent a friendly message to the Tashi Lama thanking him for the kindness he had shown 130 years ago in one of his previous existences to the Englishmen Bogle and Turner. The only result of this, however, is that two higher officials from Shigatse have been sent here to make a still more peremptory request for our withdrawal.

160. Yet, it may still be, that even if Shigatse has no power against Lhasa, at any rate the laity and the common people may have some influence against the monks ? It really is the case that a considerable portion of the laity are not opposed to intercourse with India ; and that the common people who had practical experience in 1886 of what fighting with us really means, and who have no kind of animus or fanatical feeling against us, would be perfectly willing to admit us among them. But the laity and common people have little power here as against the monks. The whole rule here is ecclesiastical. And to oppose the will of the great Lamas would mean perdition not only in the present but in many future existences. Why then should they imperil so much merely to favour intercourse with India ?

161. One last hope may still remain. The Tibetan delegates have said that if we will go back to Gyagong, they will be ready to discuss anything and everything with us there. Perhaps if we are less obstinate and stiff-necked and relax so far as to agree to this, a settlement will be possible ? I fear not. Experience with Orientals does not show that giving way ever has the effect of making them more reasonable. Its invariable effect is to make them more obstinate. They might *discuss* matters at Gyagong, but they certainly would *concede* nothing. Besides which they have no call upon our consideration. On previous occasions when commissions had been formed to demarcate the boundary, they had refused to send delegates to accompany the Chinese delegates ; they had put obstacles in the way of the Chinese delegates by refusing transport ; and they had thrown down the boundary pillars which the Chinese and British delegates had put up.

So they have no call upon our consideration, especially as even now they do not send as delegate an official of the highest rank, as asked by the Viceroy, but officials below the rank of Councillors.

162. From all this the almost inevitable conclusion to be drawn is that we shall never be able to get a trade mart established at Gyantse under the supervision of a British officer; and ensure that the Tibetans will not be able to avoid or repudiate obligations entered into on their behalf in any fresh Treaty or Convention; unless we are prepared to coerce the obstructive Lamas at Lhasa, and have the means at our disposal for keeping pressure on them. Efforts will of course continue to be made to settle the matter without coercion. But the attitude of the Tibetans being such as it is, it would be unwise not to be prepared for the possibility of having to resort to pressure.

POSSIBLE COERCIVE MEASURES.

163. What the means are for coercing the Lhasa monks it is now our business to enquire into. The first measure which suggests itself is simply blockading Tibet and stopping all trade with India. I think it would be well if we get the chance to stop any individual traders whom we know come from Lhasa Lamas, and so bring directly home to them the disadvantage of their unfriendly attitude to us. But a general blockade would probably have very little effect upon the monks. It would hurt people who are most inclined to be well disposed to us. It would damage our own traders most of all. And it would be a great blow to a trade which we want by every means to foster and not discourage. It would in fact be a futile measure, not strong enough to bring the Lamas to their knees, but just strong enough to nullify the efforts of past years in establishing a trade through Sikkim and to drive it all into Nepal.

164. A more effective measure, though still not sufficient in itself to bring the Lamas to reason, is the construction of good mule roads up to the frontier, and employing for that purpose Pioneer Regiments and Sappers and Miners. The advantage of the measure is that instead of being a discouragement to the infant trade between India and Tibet it is a direct encouragement to it. And if not only the two roads in Sikkim—the one to Khamba Jong and the other to the Chumbi valley—but also the road from Assam to Lhasa, and the road up the Sutlej valley to Tibet are by this means improved; a considerable amount of pressure will be put on the Lhasa Government, and the way will be prepared for either future military operations if that Government proves obdurate, or for future trade if they prove amenable. I mention the roads from Assam and the Sutlej valley because a little road-activity in those two directions, while it would have the effect of increasing the pressure on the Lhasa Government, would probably also have the effect of decreasing the pressure on us in the case of military operations by preventing the Tibetans from sending men from the eastern and western ends of Tibet for an effort against us in the centre.

165. This means of improving the road to the frontier at four different points may have some effect. It may encourage the small minority which doubtless exists in favor of coming to a peaceable settlement with us to raise their voices; and it may also frighten the Chinese into exerting themselves to put pressure on the Tibetans. But the Tibetan Government have been so little alarmed by what we have already done in Sikkim in this way: and are so evidently relying on outside support, that I am doubtful if even this measure would really bring them sufficiently to their senses.

166. The mention of the reliance of the Tibetans on outside support brings me to the third possible coercive measure. I have heard rumours that they rely on the Nepalese to support them against us. I am very ignorant about our relations with Nepal. On the face of it it would seem that the Nepalese would be at one mind with the Tibetans in desiring to exclude us from Tibet, for Nepalese traders do a flourishing trade at present with Lhasa, and this would be ruined if the Sikkim route were opened. They are, too, as traditionally exclusive as the Tibetans; and we have it on record that a Gurkha Raja once wrote to the Lhasa authorities, encouraging them to keep out Europeans like the

Gurkhas did according to their traditional custom. Nor can they like the prospect of seeing us established right behind them and looking straight into their back-door as we can from here at Khamba Jong. Still they have a feud with the Tibetans which they would like to settle. The Tibetans now occupy the Kirong district of Nepal on the *Nepalese* side of the watershed, and within 50 miles of Khatmandu itself. We can hardly doubt that the Nepalese would be glad to seize any opportunity for recovering this district taken from them by the Chinese in 1792. We have too the assurance of the Nepalese Prime Minister to the Viceroy at the Delhi Durbar that "he regarded the interests of Nepal as bound up with the British Government in India, and that his Government would be prepared to endorse and actively support any action which the British Government might consider necessary for the protection of those joint interests."

167. It might therefore serve a useful purpose if the Nepalese Government would send a representative to confer with me; and assist Mr. White and me in persuading the Tibetan delegates to adopt a reasonable course. The presence of such a representative in our camp would show the Tibetans that we and the Nepalese were at one in this matter, and that instead of the Nepalese having a mind to support them against us, they were much more likely to join with us in opposing them.

168. If none of these coercive measures—if neither the repairing of roads to the frontier by military means, nor the fear of pressure from Nepal as well as from us—is sufficient to make the Lhasa Lamas enter into reasonable negotiations with us; the only resource left will be to occupy the Chumbi valley, and, having occupied it, to move this Commission, with a strengthened escort, on to Gyantse.

169. When the Regent at Lhasa was shown by Hue a map of the world, he asked where Calcutta was, and being shown said "The Pelings (Europeans) of Calcutta are very near our frontier," and made a grimace, shaking his head. But after considering awhile, he recovered his composure and said: "No matter: the Himalaya mountains are between us." And an insuperable barrier they do indeed appear from here in Tibet. But fortunately for us, all the difficulties are on *our* side. The deep-cut precipitous valleys which are the real obstacles are already under our control. The *passes* present no difficulty at all. They are broad open troughs. And the country on this side (the Tibetan side) is so open that a brigade—or as far as that goes—an army corps might march along in line. There is much more room for military movements in any of the valleys here than there was in the plains round Delhi for the Durbar manœuvres.

170. Nor are the people warlike. A less warlike, and a more slack and easy-going race, it would indeed be hard to find. They have no feuds with us or dislike to us, nor any religious fanaticism against us. They are simply tools in the hands of the Lamas. Throughout their history they have been accustomed to look to the Chinese for support, and though indeed they did hold their own against the Gurkhas in the war of 1854, that seems to have been chiefly due to the Gurkhas being at the time enfeebled by internal dissensions. And in 1886-88 in the Sikkim war they allowed us to turn them out of difficult hill positions with the loss of only half-a-dozen men on our side and six or seven hundred on theirs.

171. They are quite unaccustomed to go about armed or to fight among themselves. The only arms they possessed in the Sikkim war were rough spears, swords and a few matchlocks. They may indeed since then have supplied themselves—or have been supplied—with better arms, and there are rumours of an arsenal at Lhasa superintended by a Mohamedan from India. But modern rifles in the hands of men so ignorant of and unaccustomed to their use can be of little service to them; and probably we would have more to fear from the rougher tribesmen they might collect from South-Eastern Tibet, and from the fanaticism of the monks, who, assembling in thousands in their monasteries, and investing themselves with magical power, believe themselves invulnerable, and so rush off to fight the invader. These from their numbers might be formidable, but they would not be looked upon as capable of offering any serious opposition to well-armed and trained troops.

172. The occupation of the Chumbi valley and the advance of the commission to Gyantse ought therefore to be attended with little risk.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF THE QUESTION.

173. The occupation of the Chumbi valley may, however, be regarded as an infringement of the integrity of the Chinese Empire, in the preservation of which Russia "takes an interest." We cannot treat with the Tibetans as if they were absolutely independent. We have to take some regard to the fact that they are nominally under the suzerainty of China. Our relations to China in these negotiations is, indeed, the most delicate part of them; for the hold of the Chinese over Tibet is now so slender that it is quite possible that if we press the Tibetans hard, and the Chinese instead of helping them to keep us at a distance press them hard too, they may turn round upon the Chinese and clear them out of Tibet. This is quite a possibility, and is one of the reasons why the Chinese refrain from pressing the Tibetans. It is, however, no concern of ours. If we had had to do with the Tibetans alone, we would have occupied the Chumbi valley in 1888 and possibly even advanced on Lhasa. Strictly speaking, even now we ought to hold the Chinese and not the Tibetans responsible as suzerains over Tibet for not keeping the treaty which they themselves made with us. But they have shown and even acknowledged that they are quite incapable of making the Tibetans observe the terms of the treaty. So no one could complain of our action if, to make the Tibetans afford to us those trade facilities provided for in the Convention of 1890, we occupy the Chumbi valley, which, it may be further remarked, is not part of Tibet proper, but is situated on the Indian side of the watershed.

OUR FUTURE PERMANENT POLICY.

174. But whether we go to the length of actually invading Tibetan territory or not, we must at any rate be prepared to exert a pressure on Tibet for many years to come. It is clear enough from past experience that the Tibetans will yield nothing except under pressure, and that except they feel the pressure constantly upon them, they will break the condition of any new agreement come to just as they have broken the conditions of the old. They must be regarded as children in politics, and as children never be left without control.

175. The control, however, though it should be constant, may be light. The best way to guarantee the observance of the new Treaty is to make the country really accessible; to have good roads right up to the frontier at several points, so that both we and the Tibetans can feel that whenever the conditions of the Treaty are broken, we have the means of easily enforcing it.

176. Good roads mean, too, not only a means of military offence, but of facility for trade, and by means of them it will be possible for Government to adopt a policy of both pressure and suction. While we press with all our force to establish our traders at a good mart in the centre of Tibet, we should, with good roads, and with suitable marts on those roads on our side, suck their traders out. Especially for the export of wool and live-stock several roads are required, and therefore while we ourselves press in at one road we should be prepared to entice them out at several others. For this reason we would be well-advised in improving the roads mentioned above leading into Tibet.

177. And seeing the advantage we now enjoy from the position we have acquired in Sikkim, without any direct intention of using the country as a means of access to Tibet, I think, too, we might well now make up our minds as to what are the best eventual trade routes to Tibet; and in years to come take opportunities, such as offered themselves in Sikkim, of bit by bit making them useful trade routes as we now find the route through Sikkim.

178. Of such routes one up the Amo-chu River in Bhutan to the Chumbi valley may not only prove to be capable of being easily opened, but to be the easiest way of any into Tibet. This is at any rate the opinion of Captain

O'Connor who has paid more attention to the subject of trade routes than any one else ; and of Captain Parr who as Commissioner at Yatung has lived for many months at the end of the Chumbi valley and on the Amo-chu.

179. From Assam there are three routes to Tibet about which we might seek all possible information, and which, if the information received should prove encouraging, we might take opportunities which may present themselves in coming years of opening up. These are (1) the direct and shortest route to Lhasa, that from Odalguri by Tawang ; (2) the route up the Brahmaputra by which Lhasa may be reached without crossing a single pass ; and (3) the very important route from the extreme eastern end of Assam from Sadiya, up the Lohit river to the richest part of Tibet, to districts famous for their gold and mineral wealth, and the fertility of the soil. This latter route joins on to the grand road from Lhasa to China near Batang at a distance of only 280 miles from our frontier, and would therefore, if opened, link India with China and make the rich and important province of Szechuan as accessible to Assam as Yunnan is to Burma.

180. The opening up of these last named routes are, however, projects for the future, and I only mention them here because they ought not to be lost sight of in any general considerations of the Tibetan question ; and because even at this stage I think that we ought to make special efforts to gain accurate information regarding them.

181. The upshot of all these remarks is then that, as the attitude of the Tibetans is so unfriendly, and the prospect of their observing the conditions of a new Treaty so meagre, it is necessary at once with Pioneers to commence the improvement of roads towards the Chumbi valley and the passes leading to Khamba Jong ; to be prepared to adopt similar measures, though on a smaller scale, in the Sutlej valley, and Tawang routes, with the double object of improving those routes as trade routes and of preventing the Tibetans drawing men down to the Sikkim border from the districts on them. We should also be prepared to occupy the Chumbi valley ; and lastly, we ought to acquire accurate information about the important routes which lead from Assam into the richest parts of Tibet.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

182. The thought may occur to some who have read this memorandum that after all we had much better leave these Tibetans alone, and not be too insistent upon pushing a trade which cannot amount to anything considerable compared with the trade with rich provinces in India or China. Get whatever trade concession we can in exchange for concessions on the Gyagong frontier lands and after that leave the Tibetans alone. As they themselves say, they only desire to be left at peace to worship God : why not then leave them to their devotions ?

183. The reply to such an enquiry is that we did leave them alone for a full century, but in the end, they did not leave us alone. They came right down out of their own country, and over a high range, and deliberately took up a position in a British Feudatory State ; and there against the advice and express orders of their Chinese suzerain attacked British troops. Leaving them alone has in no way ensured their friendship ; and it has on the other hand enabled our rivals in Asia to establish an influence at Lhâsa which, if not checked, would develop into a positive political danger to us.

184. It has, moreover, been proved by actual experience, during seven years in the eighteenth century, that trade between India and Tibet can be carried on without trouble or friction, and to the evident satisfaction and profit of both Tibetans and natives of India. It was proved, too, in the time of Warren Hastings, that Englishmen can be received by Tibetans on terms of the utmost cordiality and friendship, and leave behind them nothing but good feeling ; for the Tibetans are by nature open and genial and they have no caste or system of *pardah* to keep us apart.

185. Further, it is not certain that the majority of the Tibetans *do* want to be left alone. The men in whose hands lie the monopoly of power and the monopoly of trade of course do ; but we have good evidence that there are large classes, and among them the trading classes, who would welcome an increase of intercourse between Tibet and India.

186. And who can doubt that the people as a whole would benefit by the breaking of the monopoly in the hands of these ignorant and self-seeking monks? After all we are not asking anything more than that our traders should be allowed to go and trade at one single place inside Tibet, and that place only a few marches inside the frontier. By this we give the Tibetans a chance of exchanging their surplus raw produce for manufactured goods of which they stand in need. There is nothing harmful to the people in this. There is nothing but pure benefit. And the Lamas who oppose it are obviously looking not to the interests of the people but to their own.

187. Lamas would, however, reply to this that they do not mind our trading; that what they really fear is the destruction of their religion. Huc relates that when the Chinese Amban rebuked the Regent at Lhasa for admitting him into the country and told him that Huc would convert the people from Buddhism and that then the power of the Dalai Lama would be gone, the Regent replied that if the new doctrines introduced were false, the Tibetans would not embrace them, but if they were true, there was nothing to fear, for truth could never be prejudicial to men. A better answer could not be given to those Tibetans who think that the introduction of our trade at a single point will mean the overturn of their whole ecclesiastical system.

188. We need, then, have the less hesitation in pressing a measure which, while rather than being harmful, is positively beneficial to the Tibetans, has been also forced on us by the instinct of self-preservation. Apart from all questions of furthering trade facilities, we would be bound by the activity of the Russians in Tibet to demand access to the country.

189. When we have obtained this access to Tibet, and acquired as much influence there as is required for keeping Russian influence at bay, we shall have averted an insidious political danger to India; we shall have put ourselves in a position which will have as a barrier between our own frontier and the probable future frontier of Russia the whole breadth of the inhospitable Chang Thang plateau; we shall have prevented the junction of any possible future spheres of French and Russian influence north and south across Asia; and we shall, on the other hand, be in a position of support to our own efforts in Szechuan and for combining our strength from east to west.

KHAMBA JONG, TIBET :

Dated 17th August 1903.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND.